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Article Abstract

Taking Distribution Seriously
Robert Hockett

It is common for legal theorists and policy analysts to think and communicate
mainly in maximizing terms. What is less common is for them to notice that each time we
speak explicitly of socially maximizing one thing, we speak implicitly of distributing
another thing and equalizing yet another thing. We also, moreover, effectively define
ourselves and our fellow citizens by reference to that which we equalize; for it is in virtue
of the latter that our social welfare formulations treat us as “counting” for purposes of
socially aggregating and maximizing.
To attend systematically to the inter-translatability of maximization language on
the one hand, equalization and identification language on the other, is to “take
distribution seriously.” It is to recognize explicitly, and to trace the important normative
consequences that stem from, the fact that all law and policy are as distributive and
citizen-defining as they are aggregative. It is also to recognize therefore that all law and
policy treat us as equals in some respects – respects in terms of which they identify and
“count” us as politically relevant – and as non-equals in other respects. Attending
explicitly to these “respects” brings transparency about the degrees to which our laws
and policies identify, “count,” and treat us as equals in the right respects.
This Article accordingly seeks to lay out with care how to take distribution
seriously in legal and policy analysis. It does so by two means, keyed to the principal
guises in which distribution is typically implicated in legal and policy analysis: First, by
careful attention to the internal structures of the social welfare functions favored by most
present-day legal theorists and policy analysts. And second, by systematic reference to
what linguists call the “cognitive grammar” of non-formal distributive language, a
structure that mirrors the structure of distribution itself. The payoffs include both a
workable method by which systematically to test proposed maximization norms for their
normative propriety, and an attractive distributive ethic that can serve as an ethically
intelligible normative touchstone for legal and policy analysis.
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INTRODUCTION
Suppose you are a legal theorist, welfare economist, or policy analyst committed
to some normative “master principle.” You believe law and policy ought to concern
themselves solely or mainly with “welfare,” say, or with “well-being,” “utility,” wealth,
happiness, or some other such thing. Chances are, in such case, you will say we should
“maximize” this thing. And chances are likewise, if you employ formal methods in
conducting and communicating your analyses, that you will employ maximization
formulae – most likely Bergson-Samuelson social welfare functions or some variant
thereof – in so doing.1
Now if you fit this description, it might have escaped notice thus far that in doing
these things you do other things too. Implicitly, you are thinking and advocating in terms
not only of maximizing, but also of distributing and even of equalizing. For in socially
maximizing anything, we always are spreading another thing and equalizing yet another.
What is more, we are effectively defining ourselves and our fellow citizens by reference
to that which we equalize. For the attributes in virtue of which we are “counted” for
social maximizing purposes are the attributes in virtue of which we are treated as socially
relevant, hence the attributes to which, in effect, we are “reduced” for legal and policy
purposes.
1

The locus classicus is Abram Bergson, A Reformulation of Certain Aspects of Welfare
Economics, 52 QUARTERLY J. ECON. 310-34 (1938). See also PAUL A. SAMUELSON, FOUNDATIONS OF
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (1947); and KENNETH J. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES (1951). I
provide formal characterizations of my own in the Appendix below and in Robert Hockett, The
Impossibility of a Prescriptive Paretian (working paper, on file with the author). The apparatus of social
welfare functions is illuminatingly adapted to legal and social policy analysis in Matthew Adler, WellBeing, Inequality, and Time: The Time Slice Problem and Its Policy Implications (working paper, on file
with the author). Also illuminating, though ultimately insupportable, is LOUIS KAPLOW AND STEVEN
SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE (2002). A hint of the trouble with the latter is seen at once on its
face, the title itself manifesting a rudimentary category error: “Fairness” denotes a pattern of distribution,
“welfare” an object of distribution which itself is distributed fairly or unfairly. Foundational errors of
precisely this sort are among those I hope to put an end to by means of the mode of analysis proposed in
this Article. More on objects and patterns of distribution infra, II.C. and II.D.
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Suppose, for example, you advocate that we socially maximize aggregate utility.
In that case you are effectively suggesting that we distribute such things in such manners
as enhance that utility. You are also suggesting that those whose utility functions figure
into your social welfare function be counted as equals in a particular respect – here, in
respect of their utility functions.2 The respect in which you count these individuals as
equals, in turn, is the identifying feature to which you assimilate or reduce them: If you
are strictly utilitarian as per the present example, individuals just are their utility
functions so far as your conception of social welfare is concerned.3 One’s utility function
is the sole attribute in virtue of which she “counts” in your social welfare analyses.4
We can make the example more concrete:5 Say Beatrice and Benedict each have
enough resources to subsist upon. Say further that society has an additional three units at
its disposal of what I’ll call “benefit stuff” – resources available to direct toward Beatrice
and Benedict.6 Say finally that Benedict derives marginally more utility from benefit
stuff than does Beatrice, until he has received two units.7 Thereafter Beatrice receives
marginally more utility from benefit stuff than does Benedict. If we are utilitarians and
accordingly wish to maximize feasible social utility under these circumstances, we’ll give
2

Precisely this fact is what underwrites some utilitarians’ attempted justifications of their
utilitarianism on putatively egalitarian grounds – by claiming that everyone’s utility function counts “for
one” in the social welfare function. See infra, note 15, and accompanying text.
3
Assuming that each individual’s utility function counts precisely for “one” in the social welfare
function. See infra, note 14. It also is possible to weight different persons’ utility functions differently –
counting the utility functions of the handicapped or desperately ill for more, for example, as some
“prioritarian” social welfare functions might do. In such case it is her weighted utility function with which
the individual is socially identified, and the objectionability or otherwise of the identification will ride on
the reasons that underwrite the differential weightings. Fuller treatment infra, Part II.D, and the Appendix.
4
Assuming that yours is an unalloyed, “strict” welfare function. More on “strict” and “mixed”
functions infra, Part II.D, and Appendix.
5
We can also render it more abstract and formal. A summary rendition of this kind is provided
infra note 14. I’ll generally relegate such technical summations to notes and Appendix.
6
You can think of it as money if you like, or some other resource transformable into utility. See
infra, II.C.
7
I prescind here from worries about interpersonal comparability, as do utilitarians themselves.
More on such measurement matters infra, II.C.
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the first two available units of benefit to Benedict, then give the final available unit to
Beatrice.
Call the benefits, after they are distributed in this way, “aggregate-maximizing”
units, or “maximizers” for short.8 Call the benefits, prior to distribution, “generic
benefit” units, or “benefits” for short. Then there are three, even four distinct ways to
characterize what we have done in distributing things in the manner described.9 We can
say that we’ve maximized social utility. We can say we’ve distributed generic benefit
units – or benefits – unequally ex ante, two to one in favor of Benedict over Beatrice. Or
we can say we’ve distributed aggregate-maximizing units – or “maximizers” – equally ex
post over Beatrice and Benedict, and in that but no other sense treated Beatrice and
Benedict, whom we take for no more than their utility functions, as equals. In sum, we
have distributed benefits unequally in a manner that treats Beatrice and Benedict as
equals in respect of the utility functions with which we identify them – though in no other
respect10 – and in doing so have maximized something believed by utilitarians to exist,
aggregate social utility.11
Now the reason to take cognizance of this form of inter-translatability as between
maximization, distribution, equalization and identification formulations is this:
Maximization language and formulae tend to lead us, quite naturally, toward thinking in

8

They are accordingly characterized, not just in terms of their ex ante material attributes, but in
terms of their aggregate ex post utility effects when distributed over a given population of individuals.
These effects, that is to say, are “internal to,” or “constitutive of,” the things as thus individuated. Thank
you to Matt Adler and Jeff Rachlinski for pushing me to make this point more clearly. I hope I’ve
succeeded.
9
Three ways if we assimilate equalization to identification, four ways if we attend to these as
distinct characterizations in their own rights.
10
The “in no other respect” qualifier proves important for reasons that emerge presently.
11
The existence in question is often contested, partly on measurability grounds. More infra, II.C.
I prescind from such objections here.
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terms of maximization.12 And speaking exclusively in such terms leads us to thinking
exclusively in those terms as well.13 We’re accordingly apt to lose sight of the fact that in
maximizing we’re also distributing, and that in distributing we likewise are equalizing
some things while “disequalizing” other things over our fellow citizens. And then we are
apt not to notice that we are reducing those fellow citizens to some single attribute of
themselves – for example, their utility functions – in respect of which we exclusively
maximize.14
These potential blindspots present us with a normative problem. It is a problem
of normative epistemics, or “framing,” as we might nowadays call it. Our tendency to
cast legal and policy inquiry exclusively in maximizing terms is potentially problematic,
first, because it is as individuals – as recipients of distributions of various kinds – that our
fellow citizens engage our collective concern in the first place. The same tendency is
potentially problematic, second, because most of us wish to accord one another equal

12

They bear, to employ the increasingly popular idiom, “framing effects.”
You likely know the word “maximandum” or its elliptical rendition, “maximand.” Do you know
the words “equalisandum” or “equalisand”? They’re in the same dictionaries as their maximizing
counterparts.
14
Here’s a summary rendition of the point in formal terms: Maximization imperatives typically
are expressed as injunctions to “Max” the social aggregate of something called “W,” the aggregate measure
of which varies with something experienced by individuals called “u.” W is accordingly, in the typical
case, said to be a “function” of individuals’ summed u-measures. Hence W = W(u1, u2, u3, … um), where
the numeric subscripts index the u-functions of the m individuals who constitute the citizenry. And the
imperative is to “Max W = ∑ ui, where the Greek letter sigma indicates that we are summing, and the “i”
subscript indicates that we are to count each individual i’s u-measure in the sum. (This summing of course
requires interpersonal comparability, more on which later, II.C.)
Each individual’s u-measure, in turn, is itself typically viewed as a function of benefits and
burdens received or experienced by, hence distributed to, the individual. So for each individual i, ui =
ui(b1, b2, …bn), meaning simply that the individual’s u-measure is a function of a vector (or “basket”) of n
distinct benefits and burdens. (A positive function of the former, and a negative function of the latter.
Comparative contributions and detractions made by distinct b’s to the u-measure of course imply
commensurability, hence something like “price ratios,” among the b’s. More on that infra, II.C.) W is
accordingly, in the final analysis, a composite function W ○ ui ○ bj, or W(ui(bj)), meaning that W is a
function of aggregated u-measures, which are themselves functions of aggregated b-measures.
A quick formal way of putting the points made over the previous few pages, then, is that
maximizing W generally entails distributing b’s to individuals i, who are “counted” and treated as equals
for policy purposes solely in virtue of their u-functions.
13
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concern of some appropriate type – a type keyed to some politically appropriate
conception of who or what we are – in our always inherently distributive legal and policy
decisions. Talking and thinking exclusively in maximizing terms tends to obscure this.
That in turn makes it harder to discern not only whether we are distributing, equalizing,
and individuating ourselves by reference to the right things, but indeed even whether we
are maximizing the right things.15 For the inter-translatability to which I am calling
attention runs both directions: We maximize the right things only when we distribute,
equalize, and define one another by reference to the right things.16

15

Suppose, for example, we believe in equal opportunity to engage in the production of wealth.
Then what we believe ought to be maximized isn’t just wealth, full stop, but wealth produced under
conditions of equal opportunity. Call it “equal-opportunity-grounded wealth.” Call wealth not thus
produced “opportunity-indifferent wealth.” Then to act as to maximize opportunity-indifferent wealth is to
act as to maximize the wrong maximandum, by the lights of our commitment to equal opportunity. It is
best, then, to pay close attention to the linkages among all four phenomena – maximization, distribution,
equalization, and identification. That way we enable ourselves to make use of the implications of
competing proposed laws and policies upon all four as checks upon one another, in order in turn to ensure
that we’re maximizing, distributing, equalizing, and identifying each other in respect of, the right things.
16
To see this more graphically, imagine by way of one final example a simple variation on the
story of Beatrice and Benedict considered above. Our society aims now to maximize aggregate forehead
height rather than utility. Assume Benedict’s forehead is higher than Beatrice’s, and that forehead height is
genetically transmitted. Transmission in turn correlates in straightforward linear fashion with resource
consumption, we’ll suppose. (That is, more resources straightforwardly improve the chances of genetic
transmission. Please ignore for present purposes such complications as diminishing returns and any
gendered determinants of forehead measures that there might be.) Now in the name of maximizing
aggregate forehead height, we distribute all three available units of benefit stuff to Benedict. Maximization
of social forehead height, equal treatment of individuals in respect solely of forehead heights, and disparate
treatment of individuals in consequence of their equal treatment in respect of their forehead heights, then,
come to the same here, just as before in the case of utility. The foreheadist might even offer the
utilitarian’s own favored pseudo-egalitarian rejoinder to your cry of eugenics. He says, “but we have
counted each forehead only once!” See, e.g., John Harsanyi’s putatively egalitarian justification of
utilitarianism in Cardinal Welfare, Individualistic Ethics, and Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility, 63 J.
POL. ECON. 309 (1955).
Monstrous, you say. Agreed. But why? Surely it is because it is monstrous for legal and policy
purposes to identify a human being with her forehead height, which is precisely what the maximizing
“social forehead function” just countenanced as legal and policy guide does. But is an individual any more
legitimately identified with her utility function than with her forehead? Are you any more responsible for
your endorphin count – the innate neurochemical basis of your capacity to transform resources into utility –
than you are for your forehead height? Is that what your fellow citizens should reduce you to being? I
think we’ll agree it is not. But this means we both disagree with utilitarianism, as here – and as typically –
construed. Yet we’re not apt immediately to see this when we think of the latter in terms only of what it
maximizes, rather than also in terms of what it distributes, what it equalizes, and, therefore, what it take us
for being. For who but the most churlish could be against “maximizing” something so vaguely benign-
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We would do well, then, I shall maintain, systematically to crack open our
“maximization-speak” and maximization formulae, in order to lay bare their inherently
distributive, equalizing, and ultimately individual-characterizing internal structures.
Moreover, I’ll suggest, once we have done the dismantling and then turn to querying how
we ought, if at all, to amend or restructure our formulations in light of what we find, we
would do well to do something further: We should adopt a policy of addressing the
maximization, distribution, equalization and individual-characterization components of
the inquiry in reverse order.17 For there is a critical sense, we shall see, in which the
question of what we take ourselves to be for legal and policy purposes is normatively
prior to the others.18 But none of this is fully transparent until we open the internal
structures of our maximization norms to systematic inspection.

sounding as “aggregate utility,” when distracted from fully considering what that means for each one of us
as individuals and co-citizens?
We feel more immediately troubled by the forehead suggestion, I suspect, because we think
immediately of foreheads as individuals’ attributes, hence see immediately that “aggregate forehead
maximization” is reducing persons to no more than their foreheads. (“Head-counts” with a vengeance.)
“Utility,” by contrast, tends more to strike us as a mysterious substance – widely spread “good stuff” – that
none but curmudgeons could fail to want there to be more of. It is only upon reflecting that this “utility” is
produced physiologically and that “maximizing” it therefore requires we channel resources
disproportionately in favor of those with the utility-equivalent of high foreheads – steep utility curves – that
we see the moral equivalence. Hence the importance of those forms of inter-translatability as between
identification, equalization and maximization I wish here to emphasize.
17
Thank you to Trevor Morrison for suggesting that I emphasize this point.
18
Why? In short, because our principal care is with what we are and whether we’re treated
accordingly. Plausible answers to the question in what respects we are properly regarded as equals then
proceed immediately from answers to the identification question. Plausible answers to the question of what
ought to be distributed in what patterns and measures, in turn, proceed at once from our answers to the
equalization question. And thereafter, in turn, the appropriate form of maximization takes care of itself:
Distribute the right things to the right people in the right measures, and you will have maximized that
which it makes sense to maximize. But more on this infra. It comes out most starkly below in Part II.D.
Note also that many of those who seem most wedded to maximization formulae seem ironically if
nevertheless unwittingly to be logically committed to precisely this claim. For the so-called “individualist”
social welfare functions they champion acquire what ever intuitive attraction they carry from an inarticulate
understanding that it is by reference to the individuals who constitute it that a society fares well. Where the
articulation peters out for these people is at the point where we note that there are many different respects
in virtue of which individuals can be individuated for legal and policy purposes, some of which are
normatively arbitrary and others of which are not. More infra, II.C. The term “individualism” used in
connection with social welfare functions appears to originate with SAMUELSON, supra note 1.
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To attend systematically to the internal structure of maximization language and
maximization formulae, I shall argue, is a way to “take distribution seriously” – if I may
join others in using this now familiar locution.19 It is to recognize explicitly, and to trace
the more normatively significant consequences of the fact, that all law and policy are as
distributive as they are aggregative – even when expressed solely in maximization
language. It is also in consequence both to recognize, and to respond appropriately to the
fact, that law and policy always in effect define and individuate people as equals in some
respects, non-equals in other respects. It is thus finallly to recognize that the question
before us is always, at bottom, whether our laws and our policies treat us as equals in, and
thus individuate us by reference to, the proper respects.
Taking distribution seriously is, in both the proverbial “final analysis” and indeed
all well conducted analyses, to frame and thus aim our attention correctly in law and
policy-evaluation. It is ultimately, in consequence, a way of taking our fellows more
seriously when we are engaged in those forms of evaluative activity. And it is therefore a
way also of taking ourselves more seriously, both as co-citizens and as mutually
responsible legal and moral agents, when working to ascertain what we ought to be doing
collectively.

19

See, of course, RONALD M. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977). Others on whose
shoulders I would be standing include Richard Crasswell, Taking Information Seriously: Misrepresentation
and Disclosure in Contract Law and Elsewhere, 92 VA. L. REV. 565 (2006); Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A.
Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: The Problem of Market Manipulation, 74 N.Y. U. L. REV. 45
(2000); Daniel Farber, Taking Slippage Seriously, 23 HARV. ENV. L. REV. 1 (1999); George A. Berman,
Taking Subsidiarity Seriously: Federalism in the European Union and the United States, 94 COLUM. L.
REV. 1 (1994); Michael Bratman, Taking Plans Seriously, 9 SOC. THEORY & PRACTICE 271 (1983). More
waggish forays include Mark Kelman, Taking Takings Seriously: An Essay for Centrists, 74 CAL. L. REV.
1829 (1986); William E. Forbath, Taking Lefts Seriously, 92 YALE L. J. 1041 (1983); and David A. J.
Richards, Taking Taking Rights Seriously Seriously, 52 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1265 (1977).
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I thus propose in this Article to lay out with care what it might look like to take
distribution seriously in normative legal and policy analysis.20 I aim to specify in detail
what I believe to be the conditions and the appropriately structured mode of analysis,
respectively, under which normative distributional assessment is called for and apt to
bear fruit. To succeed in discharging this task is to afford means of bringing systematic
moral-conceptual clarity to legal and policy analysis bearing normatively assessable
distributive import. The key is to focus on something that I have referred to a few times
already – what I call “distributive structure.” That structure is manifest not only in all
fully analyzed social welfare functions, as suggested above and as shown in more detail
below, but also in the grammar of less formal distributive language itself. I shall
accordingly be attending to both.
The remainder of the Article, then, proceeds as follows: Part I preliminarily
characterizes the conditions under which normative distributional assessment is called
for. These are the circumstances under which who holds what can intelligibly be, and
thus ethically ought to be, evaluated as globally right, wrong, better or worse. Though
these conditions are foundational and ought to be evident, their brief enumeration serves
both to ground, and to facilitate fuller assimilation of, the more detailed discussion that
follows. They also appear to have gone oft-forgotten in much of the theoretical literature.
Part II then systematically examines five classes of question to which all law and
policy bearing distributive consequences potentially give rise. These classes of question
jointly constitute what I am calling “distributive structure.” They also prove neatly
tractable by reference to what linguists will recognize as the cognitive grammar of “to

20

And hence, among other things, what an ethically intelligible welfare- or economic analysis of
law might look like. More infra, Part III.
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distribute” and cognate infinitives – verbs like “to allocate,” “to apportion,” “to mete
out,” etc.21 The gaps opened up by this grammar – in effect, “variables” for those who
distribute, those to whom they distribute, what they distribute, per what pattern and by
what means they distribute – afford helpful bearings for purposes of systematically
structuring simultaneous attention to the full range of normative questions that legally
determined distribution invariably implicates. And it is precisely this form of plenary
attention that I believe we must now make a practice of employing, if we are to avoid
“framing-blindspots” of the kind over which I’ve been raising red flags.22
It turns out, intriguingly and in the end instructively, that the variables I mention
are not only syntactically, but also semantically interconnected:23 That is to say,
selection of particular values to fill one or more variables tends to constrain the ranges of
values with which we can plausibly fill others. At least that is so given core values that
we appear to share concerning what we are, what we most care about, what we are
responsible for, what in consequence is fair, and thus what we implicitly acknowledge
that we owe one another.24 In consequence, a single distributive upshot – one essentially
21

More on this grammar below in Part II. It should not be surprising, on reflection, that the
structure of distribution would be mirrored in the language in which we communicate about it.
22
One might draw an analogy here to the general equilibrium analysis favored by more
sophisticated economic theorists. The founding idea in both that case and this is that when items figuring
into analysis are interdependent and in that sense constitute a system, the system itself is the appropriate
unit of analysis. In the present case the system in question is the set of variables carried by “to distribute”
and cognate infinitives, all of which must be filled before a distributive claim can be determinate, and each
of which must be filled in a manner compatible with the manners in which the others are filled.
23
Traditionally, “syntax” pertains to the ordering of linguistic units, “semantics” to the
“meanings” or “cognitive contents” of those units. One of the more interesting upshots of recent
developments in cognitive linguistics is that the traditional boundary turns out to be somewhat more porous
than used to be thought. But again more infra, Part II.
24
Insofar as we think of the recipients of distributions as responsible agents, for example, it strikes
us as more sensible to think of that which we ought to distribute as resources rather than utility, since
responsible agents “produce” their own utility out of the resources they’re given. It is interlinkages of this
sort that I have in mind here, and that I map throughout Part II.
Let me, while at it here, preemptively add that in employing the first person plural I make claims
that are corroborated in two ways. First, I anticipate that the reader, on reflection, will agree that the value
commitments to which I refer are indeed her own. And perhaps more helpfully second, in Part II I shall

10

invariant, abstractly specifiable pattern of normatively appropriate allocation – appears
both to follow upon and to constrain differing plausible fillings of any particular variable:
Plausible conceptions of appropriate distribution turn out to be rather like locations along
an isoquant – a fair allocation “indifference curve,” to put the point metaphorically.25
The discussion over Parts I and II accordingly converges upon what seems to be
our logically entailed consensus understanding of the correct macro-social allocation
“isoquant.” This is, in short, the abstractly schematized normative distributional template
– or if you prefer, the conception of justice – entailed by our core value commitments, as
systematized via the grammar-grounded metatheory that structures our analysis.26 It is
the way that we appear logically committed to prescribing that distribution should
proceed, given our broadly shared conception of ourselves as fundamentally equal rightsendowed, boundedly responsible forgers of well-faring lives out of scarce, antecedently
allocated material opportunity. It is also, by dint of the linkages among distribution,
equality, and self-identification on the one hand, maximization on the other hand, a view
of appropriate distribution that commits us to a view of what we should actually be
cite empirical evidence from the behavioral economics and sociological literatures indicating that these
values are indeed widely shared, irrespective of partisan political identification. Much such evidence is
summarized in TOM R. TYLER ET AL., SOCIAL JUSTICE IN A DIVERSE SOCIETY (1998); JOHN H. KAGEL &
ALVIN E. ROTH, HANDBOOK OF EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS (1997); NORMAN FROHLICH & JOE A.
OPPENHEIMER, CHOOSING JUSTICE: AN EXPERIMENTAL APPROACH TO ETHICAL THEORY (1993). Thanks to
Kevin Clermont and Alon Harel for balking here.
25
An isoquant is simply a curve, different locations along which all take the same value in some
formal inquiry. Probably the most familiar isoquants are the indifference curves endemic to
microeconomic analysis. Changing x-coordinates along the same curve are said to be “compensated for”
by changing y-coordinates, such that points corresponding to ordered pairs (interpreted, say, as
“commodity bundles”) are at home on the same curve and thus correspond to the same “utility” enjoyed by
a consumer. If we think of normatively appropriate distributions of benefits and burdens as isoquant
curves, we’ll see that here we are able to remain on the same “curve” by changing characterizations of what
we distribute, for example, in response to changing characterizations of the pattern pursuant to which we
distribute it. If, by the way, you are inclined here to balk as did Kevin Clermont and Alon Harel, please see
supra, note 23. There’s much more infra, II.D.
26
I refer to the upshot of Part II’s grammatically-structured analysis as “meta-theoretic” because it
involves explication of the structure of all complete theories of appropriate distribution – a structure that is
manifest in the cognitive grammar of “to distribute” and cognate infinitives.

11

maximizing – something that I shall call “equal-opportunity-grounded welfare.” I’ll trace
implications of this claim both for what forms our social welfare formulae should take,
and for what forms our law and policy should take.
Part III then shows how readily the Part II-derived conception of appropriate
distribution (hence identification, equalization, and maximization) lends itself to practical
realizability, in view of legal and institutional design considerations on the one hand,
correlative feasibility constraints on the other. Indeed, this Part shows, the correct
conception of appropriate distribution looks to be much more readily realizable than are
its chief competitors – welfare and wealth maximizing views on the one hand, prioritarian
views such as “maximining” Rawlsian justice theory on the other. Moreover, much if not
most of our law and the principles that animate it prove to be best interpreted as aimed at
vindicating the distributive ethic upon which the lines of Part II all converge. That bears
obvious practical consequences for legal interpretation on the bench as well as for future
law-making in the legislatures. It also bears critical theoretic consequences for those who
debate the comparative merits of “law and economics,” “welfarism,” “Rawlsianism,” and
competing normative approaches to law and legal theory.
Not surprisingly, then, I conclude the Article with some suggestions as to its
implications for the future agendas of a more ethically intelligible, as well as more
conceptually and formally rigorous, mode of legal and policy analysis.

I. DISTRIBUTIVE CIRCUMSTANCES
Most things we find in the world are in some sense distributed, allocated, meted
or spread out, etc. Not all such spreads lend themselves to intelligible normative critique.
The chairs and the table in your kitchen are laid out in a certain arrangement, say:
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They’re “distributed” over the floor in some geometrically specifiable pattern. They
could be redistributed over that surface in many alternative ways. Absent some purpose
or value the vindication of which rides upon such arrangements, however, there will be
nothing to say whose upshot is that the arrangement “ought” to be changed.
It also happens that many distributions of things do implicate values and
purposes, some of them pressing or urgent. Such distributions accordingly fall subject to
one or another mode of normative assessment. Insofar as you are sensitive to
considerations of “feng shui” or geomancy, for example, even the spread of your
furniture will lend itself to a form of normative evaluation. Some arrangements will
aesthetically dominate others, such that you might incline toward redistributing your
furniture until it accords with the “best” possible arrangement. Counterpart remarks hold
in respect of any other value under the aspect of which the furniture arrangement might
be intelligibly evaluated – ease of reading in the late afternoon light, for example.
Normatively evaluable legal arrangements and public policies have the effect of
distributing not simply tables and chairs over floors, but perceived goods and ills over
persons. Evaluation accordingly strikes us as more pressing in these cases. Legal rules
and rulings, statutory enactments, government programs and policies of various sorts all
tend to yield “winners” and “losers” – recipients of benefits and burdens at the receiving
end.
Patterns of such policy-wrought wins and losses amount, relative to each status
quo ante they displace, to redistributions of perceived goods and ills. These
redistributions, like each status quo ante they supplant, are subject to normative critique
as readily as are furniture arrangements. Indeed they are more urgently so. For they
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implicate the ethical propriety with which we are treated. And the comparative ethical
valences of varying distributive arrangements are more compellingly salient than the
aesthetical ones: More than merely recommending actions as do the latter, the former
such valences typically require them.27
This much is more or less obvious on reflection, I take it. What seems to be less
obvious to some legal and policy analysts is that even when allocations wrought by legal
rules and policies are neither foreseen nor intended, they remain ethically assessable:
Once brought to attention, they are subject to “ought” claims whose upshots are that the
arrangements are right, wrong, better or worse, and are therefore to be improved or
deliberately left in place accordingly. In this light we are well advised to take at least
summary stock of the types of circumstance under which distributive consequences can
be said to be ethically better or worse. The set is small, but important. We’ll call its
members the prerequisites to normative distributional assessment’s being “implicated,” or
“apt.” I’ll specify them as minimally and rudimentarily as possible. Fuller detail will
build on the present foundations as we turn to distributive-ethical assessment’s full
logical form in Part II.
I take it that the minimal conditions to distributive-ethical assessment’s being apt
are these: First, there must of course be things that can be variably distributed –
“distribuenda,” we’ll call them below. Second, there must be beings to whom these
things can be distributed – “distribuees,” as we’ll call them below. Third, those to whom
27

There is of course overlap, though it falls short of extensional equivalence, between ethical and
aesthetic assessment. Dastardly people or deeds are found “ugly,” “warped,” “grotesque,” etc. (The term
“tort” itself is derived from the same Old French root-word as “torture.” The root connotes twisting.) Just
actions, persons, and patterns often are found “beautiful,” “balanced,” “harmonious,” etc. Fair allocations,
moreover, like beautiful arrangements, often appear to share some form of symmetry in common. (The
word “fair” itself derives from an Old English root that refers to the beauty of an attractive, symmetrical
face.) Would there were space here to limn these connections yet further.
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the things can be distributed must hold preferences or interests in respect of their
receiving or not receiving them: The items must be regarded or properly regardable as
beneficial or burdensome by, hence productive of some form of welfare or illfare among,
their prospective recipients. This restricts the class of distribuenda that are of normative
interest.
Fourth, the recipients of items who hold preferences or interests in respect of the
same must hold legal or ethical claims to our regard. They must be entitled to our
consideration of their preferences or interests as we distribute. We for our part must
reciprocally be under obligation thus to consider the claimants’ preferences or interests.
It is this entitlement and its correlative obligation that render our assessment of
distributions to the preference- or interest-holders normative, or ethical, in nature. It
means we are dealing with rights held by the distribuees.
Finally fifth, all items the distribution of which would be subject to ethical
assessment must be “scarce”: There must be potential for interests or preferences to
diverge or conflict. Distributions to some subclass of the full class of claimants must
entail the nonsatisfaction of another subclass of claimants’ preferences. Note that this
prerequisite, combined with the previous one, entails a need for adjudication: We require
both principled and practical means of balancing distribuees’ potentially conflicting
rights-claims against one another.
The first condition, though necessary, is not sufficient to implicate distributiveethical assessment. For it holds of any circumstance in which any form of distributive
assessment, ethical or otherwise, is apt. The second condition is necessary for
distributive-ethical assessment to be implicated, but presumably not so for distributive
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assessment more generally: There need not be beings with interests or wants in the case
of aesthetic assessment, for example.28 The third condition also is necessary for
distributive-ethical assessment to be implicated, but not for distributive assessment more
generally. The reason is the same as just mentioned in connection with the second
condition.29
The fifth condition – I’ll return to the fourth presently – is trivial in the sense that
it holds of all forms of distributive assessment, but not trivial of the class of all things that
might be distributed: There are some items that are sufficiently plentiful as not to require
zero-sum choices in their distributing, even though they are very much needed or
desired.30 Distributive-ethical assessment is apt only in respect of situations involving
distributed things not of this type – in short, under conditions of scarcity. Adjudication,
hence distributive norms, come into play only under such conditions.
The fourth condition is that in which specification of intelligible distributiveethical assessment’s prerequisites begins most seriously to “cut” – to impart potentially
controversial information. The reason is that it contestably deems some distributive
claims to be what might be called, by analogy to legal causes of action, “ethically noncognizable.” Why? Because typically the class of ethical claimants whom we consider
entitled to our regard is smaller than the class of those who might literally claim: There
are sentient creatures who presumably want things, or to be free of things, whom not

28

Unless we regard physical places as “beings to whom things – e.g., furniture – can be
distributed.” That seems not to have been all that uncommon in centuries past, when sacred places were
occasionally personified; and there appear to be some cultures where norms like these still are encountered.
29
Unless, again, we are animists who believe physical locations to hold preferences. In such case
aesthetics would extensionally merge into ethics in more or less plenary fashion. Locations would be
viewed in effect as inhabited by spirits who desire things.
30
In most places, breathable air is an obvious example. Thus far.
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everyone agrees to bear rights to have those wants considered.31 We’ll consider this
matter more fully below, in II.B. For now it suffices simply to have marked the potential,
and to have characterized the legally relevant distributive terrain.

II. DISTRIBUTIVE STRUCTURE
Distribution is internally complex. It bears a structure, a logical form. Its form,
unsurprisingly, is tracked by the form of the infinitives that name it. What linguists call
the “case,” “cognitive” or “valence” grammar of infinitives cognate with “to distribute”
manifests the structure that distribution itself always bears.32 The same grammar
accordingly manifests much of the structure that normative distributional assessment
must take if it would be both complete and intelligible. To take distribution seriously in
normative legal and policy analysis, then, we do well to attend to distributive structure, as
tracked by the grammar in which it is manifest.
Call a claim concerning the rightness or wrongness, betterness or worseness of
some law- or policy-wrought distribution a “distributive claim.” For such a claim to be
complete hence determinate, it must fill all the gaps opened by the case grammar of “to

31
There are non-citizens, for example, who seek some of what citizens seek. Unborn fetuses
might for their parts in some sense “prefer” to be permitted to reach full term. Among unambiguously nonhuman beings, in turn, bovines, pork, fish, and fowl presumably do not wish to be killed and eaten. At any
rate they often seek to avoid the violent prerequisites to their being eaten. More infra, Parts II.A, II.B.
32
Case, cognitive, or valence grammars divide sentences into predicate functions – typically verbs
– and their argument places. Most of the latter are then filled by nouns and noun phrases, but in some cases
they’re filled by adverbs – predicates of predicates, hence second-order predicates. The number and kinds
of arguments that a predicate can take constitute its “valency.” See generally Charles J. Fillmore, Toward a
Modern Theory of Case, in MODERN STUDIES IN ENGLISH 361-361-75 (David A. Reibel & Sanford A.
Schaner eds., 1969); Charles J. Fillmore, The Case for Case, in UNIVERSALS IN LINGUISTIC THEORY 1-88
(Emmon Bach & Robert Harms eds., 1968); STUDIES IN LINGUISTIC SEMANTICS (C. Fillmore & D.J.
Langendoen eds., 1971). The analysis of predicates as argument-taking functions appears to have
originated with Frege. See Gottlob Frege, Begriffsschrift, eine der arithmetischen nachgebildete
Formelsprache des reinen Denkens, in FROM FREGE TO GÖDEL: A SOURCE BOOK IN MATHEMATICAL
LOGIC 5-82 (Jan van Heijenoort ed., 1967); GOTTLOB FREGE, FUNKTION UND BEGRIFF (1891).
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distribute.” It must assign values to the variables that this and all cognate infinitives
carry with them unfilled.
The variables are, in effect, the pronouns and proadverbs that figure into the
following questions: Who is being addressed by the distributive claim? What does the
claim take for being distributed, or suppose ought to be distributed? To whom does it
take that for being distributed, or suppose that it ought to be distributed? What pattern
does the claim take properly to characterize permissible distributions to such recipients?
And how – by what physical means – does the claim take the distribution to be
effectuable?33
Call the values with which syntactically well formed and semantically complete
claims fill the variables: distributors, distribuenda, distribuees, distribution formulae, and
distribution mechanisms. The middle three variables must be filled for a distributiveethical claim to be semantically complete – i.e., for the claim to bear determinate
cognitive content in respect of whether a successfully individuated and characterized
spread of goods or ills over persons is or would be right, wrong, better or worse than
some other conceivable such spread. The first and last variables must be filled for the
claim to be what might be called “pragmatically” complete – i.e., for the claim
successfully to prescribe some possible course of action that might actually be taken.34

33

In effect I supplement pure semantics-based case grammar here with argument-places
additionally derived from linguistic pragmatics. For a claim actually to be made rather than simply
entertained propositionally, it must be addressed to someone, and must take into account means by which
addressees can effectively respond to it. In making this observation I am in effect melding classical
valence grammar with what Paul Grice would have called “conversational implicature.” See, e.g., H. P.
Grice, Logic and Conversation, in SYNTAX AND SEMANTICS, 3: SPEECH ACTS, (P. Cole & J. Morgan eds.,
1975); H. P. Grice, Further Notes on Logic and Conversation, in SYNTAX AND SEMANTICS, 9:
PRAGMATICS, (P. Cole ed., 1978); H. P. Grice, Presupposition and Conversational Implicature, in
RADICAL PRAGMATICS 183-98 (P. Cole ed., 1981).
34
Semantic completeness is necessary, but does not suffice, to confer pragmatic completeness.
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Counterpoised sides of overt or implicit distributive disputes, with apparently
varying degrees of cognizance of the fact, are effectively disagreeing over how one or
more of the just-enumerated variables should be filled. The fact that such disputes often
are implicit affords us one reason to bring the variables more explicitly into the
foreground – viz., the interest of clarity as to what, if anything, really is in dispute. But
there is another reason for attending explicitly to the variables and, thereby, to the
internal structure of distribution that they jointly constitute: It is that most of us by far, I
believe, actually agree about how the variables ought to be filled when we attend
explicitly to them.
These claims can most effectively be shown, I believe, by elaborating and
critiquing the leading variable-valuing candidates that have been either expressly or
impliedly proposed. Some of these will look at least passingly familiar. But they do not
appear thus far to have been considered together, in systematically structured relation
each to all others at once. It is precisely this lack of systematic treatment, I believe, that
renders the obscurity I lamented in the Introduction – obscurity as to the relations among
distribution, equalization, self-identification, and maximization – possible.
In an important sense, then, the argument that follows is cumulative: No one
point will be fully appreciable until all points are made. But one has to start somewhere,
and one can make piecemeal points at least provisionally appreciable. So I’ll treat
variables and candidates for filling them in sequence, doing my best in each case to look
ahead and/or backward to other variables as necessary while proceeding. The order in
which I’ll proceed will be that in which I’ve enumerated the variables above.

A. Distributors
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Law and policy, we have observed, typically bear distributive consequences. That
means that those enact and then act upon law and policy effectively distribute things. So,
in a derivative sense, do or would those who assess or evaluate law and policy. For in the
act of assessing or evaluating laws and policies bearing distributive consequences, one
prescribes in respect of those consequences. One says, in effect, how she would
distribute. Another way of putting the point is to say that distribution, like “to distribute”
and other infinitives that name it, always takes some singular or collective subject: There
must be distributors – those who distribute, or who prescribe or determine how
distribution ought to or is to proceed.
Who we understand the distributors to be naturally will tend to play some role in
determining our particular distributive-ethical norms – our “ought” claims in respect of
distribution. The converse, of course, also holds: Particular duties and those whom we
take to be subject to such duties must categorically “fit” one another. Who, then, are they
whom we take to owe each of us the benefit of acting in conformity with our distributive
“ought” claims?
That question is probably the easiest that we’ll have to address in this Article. For
there seems to be little disagreement over who the effective distributors are in most
modern legal and policy disputation, at least in modern democratic polities. “We” – the
sovereign we, all who effectively are addressed by normative legal and policy arguments
over distributive propriety – are in effect taken to be the distributors.
We are “the people” – the citizenry or humanity at large, all who bear rights to
take part in deciding what is distributively right. Or we are “the policy community” –
judges, legislators, advocates, analysts, academics and others assumed to be thinking and
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acting on behalf of that broader constituency. The latter constituency, in such case,
includes ourselves as its proxies or representative members. In either case, then, we are
effectively distributing over ourselves so far as legal and policy debate are concerned.
One consequence is that the class of distributors, particularly in modern polities, typically
converges with that of distribuees – the next variable that we shall address.
Were we gods or, perhaps somewhat more humbly, elites looking over a polity in
which formal political-decisional rights were allotted unequally in our favor, there might
be some wedge between “us” and the distribuees: We would be considering what “we”
should distribute to “them,” pursuant to what patterns and means.35 Much this disparity
between would-be distributors and would-be distribuees characterizes discourse about
animal rights, for example.36 But the “we” and the “they” of most mainstream
distributive discourse are one and the same: We are speaking of how we should
apportion goods and ills among ourselves. How, then, should we characterize ourselves
when considering what is to be distributed, pursuant to what patterns and means?

B. Distribuees
Distribution, like “to distribute” and other infinitives that denote it, takes not only
subjects, but indirect objects as well: Where there are distributions, there are distribuees
– those to whom things are distributed. Just as there must be “fit” between our
distributive-ethical norms and how we characterize distributors, moreover, so must there
be fit between those norms and how we characterize the distribuees whose rights those
35

Some theorists view “analysts” as radically distinct from the citizenry at large. See, e.g.,
KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra note 1 at 382-402.
36
See, e.g., PETER SINGER, ANIMAL LIBERATION (1976). A not entirely dissimilar disparity as
between distributors and distribuees is of course encountered in debate over the ethics of abortion, though
in this case a critical feature of the dispute is precisely the issue of whether the distribuees are members of
the distributor class. That is one reason why this dispute is more contentious than that over animal rights.
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norms vindicate. How, then, do we or should we construe the recipients of distributed
benefits and burdens? How should we characterize or identify them, what should we take
them to be?
The fact that “they” are in fact “we” here affords us a critical clue: Our being the
distributors, and our being accordingly responsible, in the final analysis, for the
distribution that concerns us says something important about us as distribuees.
Curiously, however, not everyone seems to have caught the hint. For many legal and
policy theorists and analysts, via positions they take as to how we should characterize
distribuenda and distribution formulae as discussed below, effectively commit themselves
to a view of distribuees that conflicts with the view that their likewise being distributors
would seem to entail. It is tempting to hope we might end this conflict simply by
bringing it to light. First, then, the gradually emerging consensus view of distribuees –
the one on which most seem to agree when the question of how to construe them is
explicit. Then we shall turn to the view that’s implicitly held only when analysts fail to
examine the presuppositions to which their proffered distribuenda and distribution
formulae effectively commit them.

1. Responsible Agents
The gradually emergent consensus view of distribuees among those who concern
themselves explicitly with the ethics of distribution is that which is in harmony with their
simultaneous role as the would-be distributors. It is the view according to which
distribuees are best considered what I shall call “boundedly responsible agents.”
Boundedly responsible agents largely, though not completely, determine their
own well-being. It is accordingly appropriate to hold them responsible, in some measure,
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for doing so. Not so to hold them is inconsistent with our according distribuees – hence
with our according one another – appropriate respect as freely choosing, morally
autonomous human beings. But boundedly responsible agents also are constrained, to not
fully determinable degree, in effecting their welfare by the environments into which they
are born. That is what “boundedness” means in this context. Our inherited capacities,
incapacities, advantages and disadvantages – themselves features of our environments –
permit us wide, and yet nevertheless limited, latitude in altering or exiting our
environments.
This construal of ourselves in our role as distribuees seems to be that which is
most consonant not only with our role as the ultimate distributors implicated by
normative distributional disputation, but also with our experience of action. We
experience ourselves and others both as freely choosing and as constrained to but vaguely
determinable degree in the choosing. That experience is reflected in our capacities to
experience guilt, shame, ambition for and frustration with self, resentment of and
gratitude to others. It is also reflected in cognate “reactive attitudes” we often
experience, attitudes which are intelligible only under conditions of relative freedom.37
The same complex of experiences of action – in this case, the “boundedness” portion –
moreover, underwrites our capacities to feel and extend mercy, forgiveness, sympathetic
understanding and charity toward self and toward others.
The construal of distribuees as boundedly responsible agents carries a cluster of
interlinked consequences for normative distributional assessment: First, to the degree

37

Notice of the link between responsibility and “reactive attitudes” bears a venerable pedigree.
See, classically, P.F. Strawson, Freedom & Resentment, in FREE WILL 59 (Gary Watson ed., 1982). See
also Samuel Scheffler, Responsibility, Reactive Attitudes, and Liberalism in Philosophy and Politics, 21
PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 299 (1992).
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that we view distriubuees as freely choosing, we find it appropriate to hold them
responsible in part for what they choose, hence to live with the consequences of many of
their choices. This is not merely a matter of punitive attitude, nor even of incentivessensitive productive efficiency, though of course such considerations can sensibly
underwrite the view. It is, more compellingly, a matter of human dignity, of respect. It is
part of what it is to view persons as agents – as practical forgers of fate – rather than
simply as patients or addicts – mere passive objects of fate, akin to children who “do not
know any better” or “couldn’t help it.”38
Second, an often ignored corollary of this form of respect is the imperative that all
agents be viewed as equally dignified and equally deserving of most forms of respect.
This should not be surprising upon reflection, in light of what we observed in the
Introduction: For with a conception of who we are comes a conception of the features in
virtue of which we are morally equal for legal and policy purposes. And with the latter,
we’ll see borne out, comes a conception of what ought to be distributed, in what patterns
and measures. Below we shall see that one upshot is that we owe one another equal
“material respect” – i.e., access to such exogenously given resources and opportunities as
figure into the responsible forging of successful human lives.
Another consequence that stems analytically from the view of distribuees as
boundedly responsible agents, then, is this: To the degree that we hold agent-distribuees
largely responsible for authoring their own lives, we commit ourselves to conceptions of
appropriate distribuenda, distribution formulae and distribution mechanisms as those that
38

It is tempting to suppose that some such commitment is what ultimately underwrites the Kantian
idea of a “right to punishment.” See, e.g., P.S. Greenspan, Responsible Psychopaths, at
http://www.philosophy.umd.edu/Faculty/PGreenspan/Res/rp.html; Randy E. Barnett & John Hagel III,
Assessing the Criminal: Restitution, Retribution and the Legal Process, at
http://www.randybarnett.com/assessing_the_criminal_.html.
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give latitude to the operation of responsible agency. Appropriate distribuenda will be
conceived as ex ante inputs to individual welfare or utility functions, if we think in such
functional terms – functions whose “outputs” in turn are in significant measure the
responsibility of distribuees themselves. Appropriate distribution formulae, for their part,
will speak to the ex ante distribution of such responsibility-exogenous inputs. Our
formulae will not be directly concerned with ex post, responsibility-endogenous welfareoutcomes as such. Instead they will treat these as byproducts, mediated and endogenized
by distribuees’ responsible agency as brought to bear in transforming resource and
opportunity inputs into deserved, because individually produced, welfare outputs.
Preferred distribution mechanisms, in turn, will accordingly be those that give most
effective expression to these ideals. We’ll see this borne out below.

2. Patients & Addicts
The residuum left by incomplete agency – the “boundedness” portion – might be
called “patienthood.” To the degree that one really “cannot help himself,” he is a patient
– an object of fate or of others, acted upon rather than acting. Or he is an addict – one
who quite literally “cannot resist.”39
To the degree that our agency is bounded, we are all patients. But we are not
generally apt to admit this. Indeed we are apt to feel disgust or contempt, rooted perhaps
in the perceived threat that’s posed by exemplars with whom we subconsciously but
reluctantly identify, for those who are too quick to admit limitation. Owing to that fact,
39

I intend “patient” as used here, like “agent” before, in its grammatical sense – as the recipient of
rather than the initiator of an action. See, e.g., JOHN LYONS, AN INTRODUCTION TO THEORETICAL
LINGUISTICS 340, 350 (1967); BERNARD COMRIE, LANGUAGE UNIVERSALS AND LINGUISTIC TYPOLOGY:
SYNTAX AND MORPHOLOGY 42-43, 58-61 (2d ed. 1989). Also RONALD DWORKIN, SOVEREIGN VIRTUE:
THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF EQUALITY 303 (“addicts”); Daniel Markovits, How Much Redistribution
Should There Be?, 112 YALE. L.J. 2291, 2295f. (2003) (“patients”).
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along with the indeterminacy of the boundary between choice and chance in the many
borderline cases each of us experiences each day, we tend generally to let the boundary
“take care of itself.” We do so simply by trying as hard as we can, then forgiving
ourselves once we finally “let go” when we must.
Doubtless for reasons that are rooted in facts such as these – including related
concerns with incentives40 – few if any legal or policy analysts wittingly construe
distribuees as patients. Instead they effectively commit themselves to that construal.
They do so, we’ll see, via the positions they take in respect of appropriate distribuenda,
distribution formulae, and distribution mechanisms – positions whose logical
consequences they don’t seem to appreciate.
Because welfare or “utility” draw attention to outputs rather than inputs, for
example, it is difficult, absent a Byzantine distribution formula, to be unambiguously
welfarist or utilitarian without effectively treating distribuees as not being responsible for
outcomes – hence as patients.41 Similarly, because resources and wealth are readily
viewed as welfare inputs – inputs to distribuees’ welfare functions – advocates of ex post
egalitarian resource or wealth distribution even apart from the working of distribuees’
responsible choices likewise treat distribuees effectively as patients.42
Finally, insofar as any distribution mechanism might fully instantiate some
distribution principle such as that just mentioned, it too treats distribuees as mere

40

Those incentives and their consequences are traced infra. In brief, letting agents too readily “off
the hook” results in the unjustifiable conscription of those who act responsibly by those who do not. It
also, and equivalently, results in ethically cognizable inefficiency.
41
See infra II.C, II.D.
42
Again see infra, II.C, II.D.
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patients.43 Insofar as it fails to be egalitarian prior to or apart from the operation of
distribuees’ responsible choices, by the same token, it violates ethical equality and
respect for agency. It does so by effectively treating some distribuees as deserving of less
than others even when what is being considered is pre-choice, action-antecedent claims to
material opportunity upon which action and choice are to operate. But more on this in
due course.

C. Distribuenda
Distribution and its infinitives take, in addition to the subjects and indirect objects
that implicate distributors and distribuees, direct objects as well: There are always
distribuenda – distributed things.
There has generally been more overt dispute in the theoretical literature over
appropriate distribuenda than over who or what the distributors and distribuees are. This
is likely the product of what I lamented above – our failure thus far to think-through the
linkages among all of distribution’s constitutive variables. One consequence is that
alternative proposed distribuenda turn out to be ethical touchstones. They serve as flags
under which other disputes – disputes over distribuees and distribution formulae in
particular – are pursued.

1. Welfare/Well-Being
A particularly venerable family of proffered distribuenda have gone by such
names as “utility,” “welfare,” “well-being,” “happiness,” “satisfaction” and cognate
expressions. Although there are subtle distinctions from one author to the next in
43

This prospect of course suggests that distribution mechanisms might be composite in nature:
Market allocations followed by taxation and redistribution would constitute a familiar case in point. The
suggestion is borne out infra, Part III.
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construing the terms, they all share distinct family resemblances rooted in one apparently
guiding idea. The latter runs thus: Faring well is what matters to people. Indeed this is
trivially so, in view of the meanings of words such as “good” and its adverbial form,
“well,” themselves. Indeed these terms, like “utility,” “satisfaction,” “happiness,” and
related such terms of art often are even defined simply as being what ever is effectively
“produced” by people’s preferences (or on some readings, their interests – “enlightened,”
“rational,” “ideally informed,” or otherwise) being satisfied. Law and policy, then, this
line of thinking concludes, should aim at enhancing these magnitudes. For to do so is
simply to satisfy people.
Note that nothing as yet is implied here as to what such “enhancing” or
“satisfying” would look like. Things remain pitched at a high level of abstraction.
Attending to welfare and cognates as thus counseled accordingly seems unobjectionable
– again, trivially so – so far as it goes. One might then wonder why anyone would
propose anything other than welfare as distribuendum. I think what’s objected to is not
welfare as abstract normative distributional touchstone. Rather, what people protest is
either (a) “welfare” as construed, by some of its more eccentric or irresponsible
advocates; relatedly (b) welfare as mere output that’s aggregated and socially
“maximized,” without regard to the way in which it is produced; or (c) welfare as literal,
direct distribuendum. I treat these in turn.
Construal-based objections take various forms. Most are prompted by unduly
narrow or bizarrely overbroad stipulations by advocates as to what is to count as wellfaring. Some early utilitarians, for example – Bentham and Edgeworth probably best
known among them – sometimes suggested that all that should count as well- or ill-faring
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was hedonic experience. Bentham named his rendition of this commitment the “Pleasure
Principle.” Edgeworth for his part predicted that one day a “hedonometer” would be
developed, with which we would measure utility as readily as temperature. Ramsey and
von Neumann made similar suggestions. It is even now often suggested that utility and
disutility are reducible to endorphins and C-fiber counts, respectively, rather as “water”
has come to be specified with definitive precision as H2O.
Suggestions like these prompt predictable objections and equally predictable
responsive refinements. Best known among the latter are those of such thinkers as the
later Mill, Sidgwick, and more latterly Griffin. These have sought to take seriously the
prospect that a well-faring human life might be something more than an extended orgasm
or itch-scratching.44 They nevertheless tend to treat the refined form of welfare as a
mysterious sort of substance the aggregate quantum of which ought to be maximized, at
least until their conceptions grow so refined as no longer to lend themselves to scalar
aggregation.45 But more on this in connection with distribution formulae, below.
Latterday exponents of the earlier Benthamite crudity do not banish all welfare
that isn’t hedonic in nature. They push instead to the other extreme, counting as ethically
cognizable “welfare” the satisfaction of any preference what ever.46 And so they’ve
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See, e.g., J. GRIFFIN, WELL-BEING: ITS MEANING, MEASUREMENT AND MORAL IMPORTANCE
(1986). Griffin’s refinements have turned out to be so extensive that he has ultimately found himself
compelled to abandon consequentialist ethics altogether. See J. Griffin, The Human Good and the
Ambitions of Consequentialism, 9 SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y 18 (1992).
45
See, e.g., Griffin, id.
46
See, e.g., KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra note 3 at 421-22 (“The idea of an analyst substituting his
or her own conception of what individuals should value for the actual views of the individuals themselves
conflicts with individuals’ basic autonomy and freedom.”). The short answer is that imprisonment, too,
“conflicts” with basic autonomy and freedom – that of convicts. Few, if any, disapprove of autonomy and
freedom, just as few disapprove of welfare or well-being. But the question has always been how we are to
demarcate individuals’ legitimate spheres of autonomy satisfactorily, and that question of satisfactory
demarcation is part of the question of fair allocation. See infra II.D. The “we don’t want to judge”
disclaimer accordingly avails nothing. Determining fair allocation is judging period. All law and policy
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occasioned predictable objections, as well as refinements reminiscent of Griffin’s.
Objections in this case take account of the fact that a preference itself can be ethically
problematic, either in itself – because, say, expressly or even recursively anti-ethical – or
as the product of, hence as endogenous to, antecedent distributive circumstances that are
themselves ethically objectionable.47
It is deeply incoherent, for example, to say of the thief that “he fares well,” or that
“his well-being improves,” when he succeeds in stealing more goods.48 For the thief is
by definition the person who violates distributive norms – norms in conformity to which
“good” and “well” must themselves be defined.49 To call the thief’s satisfaction
“welfare” rather than “satisfaction” is to conflate desire with desert. It is therefore to lose
the distinction between description and prescription, positive and normative, “is” and
“ought.” It is accordingly to relinquish the capacity to prescribe or evaluate at all, hence
to abandon normative legal or policy analysis themselves.50
It would seem likewise if less starkly misleading, in most cases, to say of the
slave who has come to accept what she’s told of her putative race-rooted “inferiority,”
that she is “better off,” or that “her welfare improves,” relative to some alternative

require such determinations. Use of the ethically loaded terms “welfare” or “well-being” rather than less
deck-stacking terms such as “preference-satisfaction,” moreover, registers precisely such judgment.
47
On recursive preferences, see Robert Hockett, Recursive Social Welfare Functions (working
paper, on file with the author). Also Robert Hockett, Reflective Intensions: Two Foundational DecisionPoints in Mathematics, Law, and Economics, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 1 (2008) (forthcoming). On
preferences that are endogenous to unfair antecedent distributive circumstances, see, e.g., G. A. Cohen, On
the Currency of Egalitarian Justice, 99 ETHICS 906 (1989); A. K. Sen, Equality of What?, in EQUAL
FREEDOM: SELECTED TANNER LECTURES ON HUMAN VALUES (Stephen Darwall ed., 1995).
48
Or that Nazis are “better off” when they murder more “non-Aryans,” etc.
49
See, Hockett, Prescriptive Paretian, supra note 1. See also Robert Hockett, Why Paretians
Can’t Prescribe: Preferences, Principles, and Imperatives in Law and Economics (working paper, on file
with the author).
50
See sources cited id.
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circumstance in which she rejects her race-rooted identification and demands respect.51 It
can be conceded that because, unlike the thief, she is presumed faultless, we are able to
view her having come to terms with her situation as affording some good in mitigating
her otherwise bad lot. But to say that her “welfare” is improved in this way is
nevertheless misleading for its failure to register the wrongfulness of the circumstance
that renders her resignation consoling. If we are to maintain the distinction between
positive and normative with precision, then, it is again more accurate in these “tamed
housewife” cases to say “she’s resigned to her unjust circumstances” than that “her
welfare is higher.”
Non-construal-based objections to welfare as distribuendum are rooted in the fact
that welfare is not a directly measurable or distributable substance. The physical
distribution problem is the most immediately apparent: Whether understood as
endorphins, preference-satisfactions, idealized or fully-informed or ethically-laundered
preference-satisfactions, etc., welfare just isn’t a thing that’s directly doled out. It is,
rather, at best “produced” by distribuees, from physical things that are doled out. That
opens two lines of concern flagged by theorists who do not count themselves unalloyed
welfarists.
First, in order practically to be welfarist, one must operationally be “something
elseist” as well – e.g., wealthist, resourcist, etc.52 Second, since welfare emerges from
what distribuees do with what ever is literally distributed, and since the latter materials
are in most cases scarce, would-be distributors must decide how to respond to
distribuees’ capacities and responsibilities for producing their own welfare out of what
51

Even if the respect is not forthcoming. But see ARTHUR SCHOPENHAUER, DIE WELT ALS WILLE
(recommending, in Vol. I, Bk. 4, Vedantic resignation).
52
More on wealth, resources, etc. infra next subsection.
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they are allotted. The fuller significance of these opened lines will emerge presently,
both in connection with competing proposed distributenda, and in connection with
distribution formulae, below.
There are also, finally, familiar measurability concerns occasioned by welfare as
proposed distribuendum: On most present-day construals, as noted above in II.C.1,
welfare no more lends itself to practicable quantifiability or interpersonal comparability
in the holding than it does to direct distributability. Commensurability is the one
measurement task for which welfare does not present difficulties, since in theory it serves
as a numéraire in terms of which more concrete items might be comparatively valued.
The trouble, of course, is that in view of its unamenability to actual quantification or
interpersonal comparison, it can serve as numéraire only “in theory.” It is of no practical
use at all. But please hold that thought till we cover the next proposed distribuendum.
We shall presently see that in these just mentioned respects, “subjective” welfare
is, measurability-wise, the inverse image of more “objective,” physical distribuenda. In
fact it appears that the two things – welfare and the physical items from which distribuees
derive it – must be brought together in some way for distribuendum-measurement
problems to be addressed in an ethically intelligible manner. This too, along with its
practical consequences, will emerge presently as we proceed.

2. Resources/Wealth
The principal competitors to welfare as proposed distribuendum have historically
been material resources or wealth of one sort or another. And resources’ more specific
construals, like welfare’s, have ranged from simple and abstract to complex and
concretely particular. The simplest and most abstract characterization is simply as wealth
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– some index-tied medium of exchange or scalar “stuff” that recipients can transform into
welfare purchasing and consuming more variegated goods and services.53 More complex
and concretely particularized characterizations include Rawlsian “primary goods,” among
others.54
As indicated at the end of the previous subsection, the advantages and
disadvantages of resources as prospective distribuenda can be viewed as the inverse
image of the disadvantages and advantages of welfare. As for advantages: First,
resources are directly distributable. Relatedly second, they are readily measurable, at
least in respect of simple quantification and interpersonal comparability in the holding, as
noted above in II.B.1. And finally third, they provide space for the working of
distribuees’ at least partial responsibilities for effecting their own well-being: What
satisfactions distribuees enjoy will ride partly upon what they do with their resource
allotments. That seems to most people both ethically right and, incentives-wise, efficient.
More on that when we turn to distribuees, distribution formulae and distribution
mechanisms below.
Resources’ disadvantages are straightforward functions of the degree to which, if
any, considerations of the propriety of their spread are detached from considerations of
welfare. Where the severance is complete and entire, resourcism devolves into fetishism.
In such case the stuff that is spread is best viewed as – though surprisingly not observed
in the literature to be – not even so much as cognizable as “resource,” “wealth” or the
53

Including risk-bearing services, the fuller significance of which emerges below in III.A.2. This
rough characterization of wealth, incidentally, is cognate with but not identical to that offered by Posner in
the 1980s, as discussed below in III.A. A suitable synonym for my usage would be “purchasing power.”
54
See, e.g., J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 54-55, 78-81, 358-65 (rev’d ed., 1999). I prescind
from those complexities here. They are not germane to present purposes and bracketing them accordingly
does no harm. Fuller discussion is found in Robert Hockett & Mathias Risse, Primary Goods Revisited
(under revision for ECON. & PHIL.).
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like. They cannot be so any more than, say, Nazis’ or thieves’ preference-satisfactions
are ethically cognizable as “well-being.”
We should always bear this in mind: Resources are, trivially and yet oftforgottenly, in every case resources for something. They count as resources, as
distinguished from merely insipid, ethically inert substances, only by reference to
purposes, hence preferences, that users have for them. “Wealth” for its part, derived as it
is from the Middle English “weal” as in “common weal,” is cognate with “well-being”
itself. So resources or wealth, even to count as such, have to be tied in some manner to
that which concerns the distribuees who engage our normative distributional concern –
well-being. The question thus opened is: In what way, precisely? The full answer
emerges only once we’ve arrived at proposed distribution formulae and distribution
mechanisms, below.55
Relations between resource and welfare implicate measurement matters too. As
noted before, resources raise no direct challenge where quantification and interpersonal
holdings-comparison alone are concerned. But they do raise an indirect challenge where
the ethical relevance of quantities and holdings are concerned. For ethical relevance
here, as just observed, is tied partly – though critically – to welfare-yield. And for related
though distinct reasons, resources raise a direct challenge where commensurability is
concerned.
The indirect challenge is this: Suppose that a given distribuendum yields
differing welfare measures to differing distribuees. Suppose also that welfare is
ultimately what matters. Suppose finally that welfare itself is, as observed earlier, not
practicably quantifiable or interpersonally comparable in the holding. If we accept those
55

Infra II.D and III.A.
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three plausible suppositions, then it is not immediately apparent what ethically cognizable
advantage is offered by resources’ quantifiability and interpersonal comparability
advantages.
The direct challenge is this: Suppose resources are disparate. Suppose also that
each is not properly subject to its own distribution formula. Then some means of
indexing must be developed for such terms as “total resources” or “wealth” to bear
content. But now note that de facto valuation occurs when comparative weightings are
assigned to vector components in fashioning the scalar along which “total resources” or
“wealth” are to be quantified. Note also that ethically satisfactory such valuation must
again involve measurement-challenging welfare. It follows, in such case, that indexing
too will be problematic. How, then, to make resource-measurement ethically intelligible?
Fortunately it happens, again as we’ll see, that a well specified distribution
mechanism allows both for unobjectionable indexing and for ethically intelligible
coupling of readily measurable disparate resources (or wealth) and human welfare. I
must then again ask the reader to bear with me until we’ve completed this Part.

3. Opportunity/Access
One perceived difficulty attending resources as proposed ditribuenda is a
counterpart to the objectionable preference problem attending many construals of
welfare. It has in consequence occasioned a distribuendum candidate that differs in the
articulation, but at bottom amounts to a mere fuller naming of resources.56 The idea is
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The difficulty was flagged just above: It’s the danger of fetishism. The sense in which it is
counterpart to objectionable preferences in welfare-construal is this: The danger that afflicts welfare is that
all preferences – even admittedly antiethical ones – might illicitly be counted, when satisfied, as affording
normatively cognizable “welfare.” The danger that afflicts resources is at the other extreme: It is that no
preferences will be considered when labeling ethically inert, non-valued substances “resources.”
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this: Because welfare, or “advantage,” is what matters to people, material stuff in itself is
not ethically salient. Moreover, since material resources are variegated and accordingly
in need of commensuration if they are to be spread under one distribution formula, some
common denominator is required: And that’s again welfare, or advantage. Accordingly,
the item whose spread can intelligibly engage our distributive-ethical concern or
assessment, even if material in nature, must be understood as “opportunity for welfare,”
or “access to advantage.”57
For reasons that will be plain in light of II.C.3 just above, I think that “opportunity
for welfare” and “access to advantage” as so described are best understood simply as
alternative christenings of resources or wealth. Their advantage over the terms
“resources” or “wealth,” if such they carry, stems merely from a possibility noted above:
That some people have grown numb over time to the fact that resources or wealth, to be
resources or wealth as distinguished from unwanted hence ethically inert material, just
are opportunities for welfare.58 They are modes of access to advantage. Resources and
wealth represent, one might say, “material opportunity” – opportunity to satisfy wants, to
effectuate plans, to build lives, hence potentially to enhance welfare, well-being, etc.
Henceforth I shall accordingly use the terms “resource,” “wealth,” and “material

“Resource,” like “welfare,” is an ineluctably value-laden term. It is worth noting that “resource” is subject
to objectionable over-inclusive construal as well, just as “welfare” is subject to objectionable underinclusive construal: Just as it is philistine to treat welfare as solely hedonic, it is grotesque to claim all
things the possession of which might afford pleasure can be counted as “resources.” Slaveholders and
some husband seem often to have viewed human beings in this way, for example.
57
See, e.g., R. J. Arneson, Equality and Equal Opportunity for Welfare, 56 PHIL. STUD. 77
(1989); R. J. Arneson, Liberalism, Distributive Subjectivism, and Equal Opportunity for Welfare, 19 PHIL.
& PUB. AFF. (1990); Cohen, Currency, supra not 43. An analogue in the case of welfare would be
someone’s suggesting we use “ethically compatible preferences” instead. Just as the term “welfare”
already connotes such conditions (in contrast to “satisfaction” or “utility”), the word “resources,” I am
claiming, already connotes the conditions I note here.
58
Rather as some seem to have grown numb to the fact that well-being is not ethically unevaluated
pleasure.
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opportunity” by and large interchangeably, with occasional caveats registered where
necessary.59

D. Distribution Formulae
“To distribute,” like other verbs, is subject to adverbial modification. Distributive
claims effectively mandate conformity to one or another such modification: They say, in
effect, “things should be distributed thus: ...” Such mandates are themselves in turn
subject to feasibility constraints that figure into further adverbial modifications – claims
of the form: “Things can be distributed thus: …” In sum, then, we ask both “how
ought?” and “how can?” The class of possible replies to the second question effectively
constrains plausible replies to the first.
In posing the first question, we are asking for specification of what I call a
“distribution formula.” In posing the second question, we ask for specification of what I
call a “distribution mechanism.” I treat of the first here, the second in Part III.
Historically there have been three leading candidate-families on offer as
distribution formulae. I call their advocates “maximizers,” “maximiners,” and
“egalitarians” of one stripe or another. Each family is best known through one or two of
its historically most influential members. Each also has featured one or more members
argued for by appeal to hypothetical veiled choice scenarios. I’ll accordingly first discuss
each of the distinct families of candidates by reference to its best known members. Then
I will briefly discuss veiled choice scenarios as employed in respect of all three. Then I’ll
59

Such caveats as I’ll register concern the distinction that one must draw, in some cases, between
what I’ll call “ethically exogenous” and “ethically endogenous” resources, wealth and opportunity.
Ethically exogenous holdings are those one is not responsible for. Ethically endogenous holdings are those
one is responsible for. The discussion of distribution formula, below, elaborates the normative significance
of this distinction. The relevance of the distinction at present is simply that the terms “material
opportunity” and “resource” possibly connote ethical exogeneity immediately to many, while “wealth”
probably does not.

37

conclude with (a) observations on the inter-formulability of maximizing and equalizing
formulae, and (b) cognate observations on the distributional equivalence of many
formulae with differing “mixes” of variable-valuations.

1. Naïve Maximization
The best known maximizing distribution formulae on offer are those I call “naïve”
such formulae.60 The operative ideal behind such formulae is disarmingly simple: It is
that what ever is distributed should be distributed in such manner as maximizes the
quantity of some aggregate taken to be normatively salient. Typically, that means
somehow-aggregated wealth or welfare, summed over the distribuees who hold or enjoy
it.61 If distribution D1 yields aggregate wealth or welfare W1, D2 yields W2, and W2
exceeds W1, then D1 ethically dominates D2 on this view. Our goal, simply put, is:
Max ∑ Wi,
1n

where “i” indexes by distribuee and “n” designates the number thereof in the society in
question.62
Maximization in so unalloyed a form has, unsurprisingly, provoked objections.
These include charges of (a) fetishism, (b) objectionably unequal treatment of distribuees,
(c) objectionable treatment of distribuees as nonresponsible patients, or less often (d)

60

Strictly speaking, maximization can no more be literally a distribution formula than welfare can
be a literal distribuendum. It serves, rather, like welfare, as a touchstone or focal point. The idea is to
distribute in such manner as will maximize some aggregate, just as in the case of welfare as distribuendum
one is to distribute something other than welfare in such manner as produces welfare in distribuees. For
this reason it turns out, as claimed in the Introduction, that maximizing and equalizing formulae are
interformulable. See infra II.D.4.
61
Welfare aggregation and maximization are associated with utilitarian ethics. Wealth
maximization is associated with normative economics of law. More infra, III.A.
62
Please bear in mind that this is the form of “naïve” maximization formulae. More on departures
from the basic form as we proceed. See also supra, note 14, and infra, Appendix.
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some combination of these. It is insufficiently observed, I believe, that the combined
objection, (d), is analytically the most satisfactory. For the separate objections are not
really orthogonal. One tends conceptually to entail the others, as we’ll now demonstrate.
The fetishism charge is more typically aimed at naïve would-be wealthmaximizers than welfare-maximizers, though this fact reflects a confusion that should be
unveiled. The idea is that maximizing wealth for its own sake, shorn of the proper ethical
regard for wealth-makers and -takers, is ethically indistinguishable from maximizing,
say, the quantum of blue-colored surface-area in the universe. There seems no ethically
cognizable reason for such pursuit if it does not entail proper treatment of distribuees
person by person. And if it is indeed individuals who ultimately matter to us, then what
constitutes proper treatment of individuals should be explicable without reference to any
aggregate; it must be independently specifiable.63
Though it is less often, if indeed ever, observed, naïve welfare-maximizing is
subject to precisely the same charge of fetishism as is naïve wealth-maximizing. Welfare
might well be – indeed might stipulatively or otherwise trivially be – “what matters” to
people. But if produced by means that are indifferent to the proper identification and
treatment of numerically distinct, politically equal distribuees, it is no less ethically inert
than is wealth or blue surface-space. For again, normative concern for individuals
requires attention to the deserved or earned wealth or welfare of each antecedently equalrights-bearing citizen, one by one. Individualist normativity takes no cognizance of any
antecedently defined aggregate – even a welfare aggregate – in terms of which
individuals’ rights are but posteriorly defined and apportioned. To hold otherwise just is
to hold that the aggregate’s distribution does not normatively matter, hence that
63

For reminder of the basis of this supposition, please see supra, notes 19, 20, and associated text.
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individuals and their political equality do not matter.64 And that is precisely what’s
fetishist.
The unequal treatment charge leveled at naïve maximization is, in view of the
foregoing, readily seen to be deeply connected to the fetishism charge: It stems from the
possibility that what ever is maximized might be maximized by means that effectively
treat persons as being of ethically differing status, even before or apart from their
ethically endogenous, responsible choices.65 It can in theory turn out, for example, that
aggregate welfare or wealth would be maximized simply by euthanising faultless
depressives or handicapped persons.66 Or it might be that maximization would be best
effected by channeling resources or wealth toward persons blessed with high endorphin
counts or otherwise highly resource-responsive welfare functions. Those would be
people who, like Benedict in the Introduction, derive disproportionate pleasure from what
they receive.67 The fact that naïve maximization imperatives do not prohibit such
measures in principle – and indeed seem to welcome them – it is argued, demonstrates
maximization’s unsuitability to the task of articulating an ethically defensible distribution
formula.68
The patient-treatment objection to naïve maximization is the flipside of the
unequal treatment objection. Hence it is, like the latter, also conceptually wedded to the
64

Some such intuition underlies Robert Nozick’s “utility monster” objection to utilitarianism. It is
not accidental that Nozick commences his essay with the observation that “individuals have rights.” See
ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA ix (1974).
65
In such case we might say they are treated as being “antecedently” or “exogenously,” hence
ethically essentially unequal.
66
Richard Posner professed in the early 1980s to be troubled by this possible consequence in the
case of welfare-maximization, but then puzzlingly dismissed the concern in the case of wealthmaximization. See infra III.A.
67
See again Nozick, supra note 69. An internal relation, then, between unethically unequal
treatment and fetishism.
68
It is no answer to say that this does not typically happen in practice. Normativity concerns not
happy accidents, but principles.
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fetishism objection: It is, in effect, that distribution effected on the basis of morally
arbitrary features of faultlessly disadvantaged persons69 does more than treat the latter as
effectively expendable and non-rights-bearing. It also treats morally arbitrarily
advantaged persons70 as being of meritlessly higher ethical or political status. And,
crucially from the vantage of this objection, it does so quite apart from that which
constitutes the beneficiaries as fellow citizens – their responsible human agency.
There is a deep sense in which the latter is, so to speak, “metaphysically”
patronizing. The advantage enjoyed is disturbingly contingent, and in consequence
alienating and demoralizing: One’s birth into a right to larger distributive shares than
those enjoyed by others is the product of a dubious “blessing.” It is effectively her birth
into a polity that treats her as a patient and, indeed, as an object. For she is treated as one
whose politically honored advantages are not really her own – not the product of her
agency – but instead a conditional gift conferred by society in virtue of an accident. They
are conferred simply because the beneficiary is, so to speak, “productively blonde.”71 In
such a polity she is only contingently favored, by mere accident of birth. She is a mere
funnel into which the channeling of resources simply happens to produce a higher
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Depressives and handicapped persons, say, as just countenanced.
“Utility monsters” and talent-Übermenschen, say.
71
Imagine a society in which blondes were so rare that birth with blonde hair was viewed as a sign
from the gods. A rare blonde is in consequence treated as an avatar, maintained in a temple and endowed
with sacramental gifts. I there not an obvious sense in which such “lucky winners” would experience
themselves as freakish, radically separated off from others? The sense in which this is damaging to the
putative beneficiary will be familiar to those who have read of the psychological damage experienced by
many members of royal and celebrity families. It is also a staple of fiction concerning the longings of
celebrities, royalty, avatars and even angels to lead ordinary lives. See, e.g., MARK TWAIN, THE PRINCE
AND THE PAUPER (1882). Also such films as Roman Holiday, The Last Emperor, and Wings of Desire.
70
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aggregate. That, it can be argued, is deeply disrespectful and ultimately harmful of the
self – that of the fortunate as well as of the unfortunate.72
A final objection to naïve maximization is rooted in measurement challenges of
the kind surveyed above in II.B.1. Where welfare is held out as maximandum, the
objection is that welfare is not sufficiently amenable to interpersonal comparison in the
holding as to lend the idea of its aggregation and “maximization” any workable content.
Where wealth is the proposed maximandum, the measurement-rooted objection finds its
ground ultimately in commensurability: One objects that the absence of markets in many
valued or potentially valued goods and services – including risk-bearing services –
renders the “wealth” that is maximized an ethically incomplete index. Or, relatedly, one
points to one or another variant of the so-called “Scitovsky paradox” and concludes that,
since two states can be Kaldor-Hicks superior to one another and the Kaldor-Hicks
criterion accordingly does not yield an ordering, “wealth” likewise is not sufficiently
determinate an aggregate as to be amenable to intelligible maximization.73
Naïve maximizers offer well-worn rejoinders to these objections. To the
fetishism charge, the rejoinder is either that welfare is what matters to people (in the case
of welfare-maximizers) or that wealth affords opportunity to satisfy preferences hence
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Because the favorable treatment is contingent upon morally arbitrary, accidental features, and is
accordingly withdrawable immediately upon even accidental loss of such features. Some such intuition as
this would appear to underwrite the expressions of alienation, anxiety, and even humiliation sometimes
heard from people who are found physically attractive by large numbers of others. Analogous concerns
sometimes are registered by opponents of affirmative action programs who have been beneficiaries of such
programs. See, e.g., CLARENCE THOMAS, MY GRANDFATHER’S SON: A MEMOIR (2007). There is a link
here to the notion of a “right to punishment” as well, per note 60 above. The link is well drawn in FYODOR
DOSTOEVSKY, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT (1866).
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See Tibor Scitovsky, A Note on Welfare Propositions in Economics, 9 REV. ECON. STUD. 77
(1941); also Jules L. Coleman, Efficiency, Utility and Wealth Maximization, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 509
(1980). The determinacy objection also is grounded in distribution. More infra III.A.
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welfare (in the case of wealth-maximizers). In both cases, it is concluded, maximizing
cannot, in consequence, be fetishistic.
This rejoinder is a non sequitur. The fetishism charge is not that welfare and
wealth do not matter.74 It is that their naïve maximization does not matter. It is that
naïve maximization misunderstands the ways in which welfare and wealth matter. As
themselves, these of course matter by definition, hence trivially, to everyone. But as
maximized in aggregatum pursuant to a merely additive maximizing formula, they at best
matter only, or objectionably disproportionately, to those lucky enough to attract
distributions in owing to such of such unearned advantages as happen to be welfare- or
wealth-productive for them. Welfare or wealth will not in such case matter to “us,”
whose collective role is that of evaluating a distribution formula’s ethically appropriate
treatment of each rights-bearing constituent member of the distributing polity that we
jointly constitute.
To the unequal- and patient-treatment charges, naïve maximizers also have
offered rejoinders that amount to non sequiturs. In the case of the unequal treatment
charge, the rejoinder is that maximization counts each person’s utility or wealthproduction function for one in the social welfare function. One individual function, the
claim runs, one “vote,” hence equal treatment. We encountered this “Hail Mary” play
above, in the Introduction.75
The reply is a non sequitur for reasons also noted above, in the Introduction: It
unethically reduces distribuees to their welfare- or wealth-production functions. That
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The rhetorically rich but perhaps overstated title of a well-known article by Dworkin might be
partly responsible for this misunderstanding. See infra, III.A. The misunderstanding itself permeates D.
Bruce Johnsen, Wealth Is Value, 15 J. LEG. STUD. 263 (1986).
75
See supra note 17 and associated text.
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mis-identification amounts to a form of fetishism in respect of distribuees on all fours
with naïve maximization itself’s fetishism in respect of distribution formulae. One is no
more one’s wealth- or welfare-function than one is one’s nose. If people are both
faultlessly and non-creditably born with differing such functions,76 then equal treatment
of those functions is unequal treatment of those born with them. And it is precisely that,
in effect, to which those who level the unequal treatment objection object.
To the treatment-as-patients objection the rejoinder is cognate with, but is a
partial misappropriation of, the claims about distribuees made by the objectors
themselves. The claim here is that, since distribuees are boundedly autonomous agents
who act partly to produce their own welfare or wealth, and since distributing so as to
maximize welfare or wealth is to distribute disproportionately to the best, “most
efficient” such welfare- or wealth-producers, maximization effectively coincides with
agent-rewarding.
This rejoinder is half right, half non sequitur, and so we shall find it half-echoed
in what turns out to be the most plausible characterization of the correct distribution
formula further below: The problem is that it places the cart before the horse, so to
speak, and in so doing fetishizes – attributes life to – the cart. If distribuees bear rights to
equal treatment as agents ex ante, prior to engaging in the actions for which they are
responsible, then the “horse” should be distribution considered prior to the consequences
for any ex post aggregate. For that aggregate is as much the product of agents’
responsible actions as it is of the ex ante distribution. Attend to the propriety of the latter,
then, and the appropriate aggregate – the nonfetishist, ethically cognizable aggregate –
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will effectively take care of itself: It will be maximized quite “automatically” ex post by
responsible agents, as the output of their actions upon the correctly, ex ante distributed
inputs.77
Maximizers do not appear to have arrived at a canonical rejoinder to the
measurement-rooted objections to maximization. I think that’s no accident. The key to
an answer, I believe, again lies in turning away from the assessment of distributive
welfare-outputs altogether, in favor of the assessment of distributive resource-inputs.
Once we do that, ready answers to all measurement challenges are immediately
forthcoming. I’ll defer elaboration to Part II.E, on distribution mechanisms.
I should note here before moving on that those who derive maximization
imperatives from hypothetical veiled choice scenarios have better, though still
problematical, answers to objections to maximization than those I’ve surveyed in the
foregoing paragraphs. I defer treatment of these to Part II.D.4. For veiled choice
arguments are commonly offered to defend the remaining two distribution formula
candidates as well, and are all most efficiently dealt with at once.

2. Prioritarian Maximining
A recently influential family of candidates for distribution formulae, so-called
“prioritarian” views, are prompted by some of the shortcomings of naïve maximizing just
discussed. We shall see that they are not, however, adequately responsive to them.
Probably the best known prioritarian distribution formula is also one of the earliest. I
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Cognate observations apply to those maximizers who observe that maximizing might tend to
coincide with equalizing in view of the diminishing marginal utility of wealth, or of what ever else is
distributed. Quite apart from the claim’s ignoring responsible agency and its reliance upon the happy
accident of concavity, it invites the question: If you’re serious about equality, why bother with naïve
maximizing at all? More infra, II.D.4.
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refer to the “maximin” formula defended most thoroughly by John Rawls. The principal
motivating idea behind Rawls’s and many other prioritarians’ arguments is this: Many of
the differences among persons that effectively recommend disparate treatment of them in
the service of naïve maximizing imperatives are, as Rawls put it, “arbitrary from a moral
point of view.”78 Such differences, Rawls concludes, precisely because they are morally
arbitrary, should not be distribution-determinative. They must, if we’re to be serious
about identifying and treating one another as moral equals, in some way be neutralized.
Now neutralizing such differences altogether, Rawls seems to have recognized,
would result in our pursuit of an egalitarian distribution formula of some sort. Indeed it
might even result in an outcome-egalitarian formula, though this isn’t clear.79 But Rawls
shied away from full-bore egalitarian distribution of any sort, on the theory that some
departures from equality might render even the “worst-off” among unequals “better-off”
than they would be under conditions of equality. In consequence, Rawls concluded,
departures from equal distribution are morally tolerable if, but only to the degree that,
they tend to better the lot of “the worst-off.”80
Rawls labeled this Grundnorm “the difference principle.” If naïve maximizing is
tide-raising, we might say, and if a rising tide not only lifts all boats but lifts them so high
that the lowest are raised higher than they would have been under an egalitarian
distribution formula, then maximization will be ethically permissible. But it will be so
only on condition that – and differing egalitarian distributions will be socially preferenceorderable precisely according as – “the minimum” is maximized too. The aim, then, is:
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RAWLS, supra note 41 at 72.
The sense in which it’s not clear will emerge presently.
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There’s quite a leap here. But I aim here to exposit, not defend, Rawls’s chain of reasoning.
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Max ∑ Wi,
1 n*

where “i” again indexes by distribuee and “n*” designates the best-off member of the
worst-off class, hence the cut between “worst-off class” and all others. Maximin is
accordingly the formulaic upshot of Rawls’s difference principle.
Both the difference principle and maximin turn out on reflection to be only a bit
better than non sequitur responses to Rawls’s specific objections to naïve maximization.
They turn out in consequence to be rather crude, coarse-grained remedies, if indeed
determinate remedies at all.
For one thing, “the worst-off” class is quite indeterminate: Not only is it unclear
whether it is the worst off person, the worst off .1% of persons, the worst off centile or
decile or quintile or what ever: It is unclear even how we are to decide. No principles
are on offer, nor does any particular rationale seem to offer itself.81 That’s a bit troubling
given that maximin is meant to neutralize morally arbitrary determinants of distributive
shares and thus afford ethically satisfactory guidance to law-makers.
A closely related difficulty is that the idea of the “worst-off class” does not even
seem to be clearly conceived or intelligibly motivated, let alone defined, by Rawls with
any view to the reasons for anyone’s being worst off. Rawls draws no distinction, for
example, between those who are worst-off by chance and those who are in effect worstoff by choice, say in owing to self-destructive behavior, for example. Yet if any
81

Rawls’s failure to offer a basis on which to make the cut does not seem to me accidental. There
is no principled basis. And that, I believe, stems directly from the difference principle’s failure directly to
address its own motivating concern – the concern with morally arbitrary distinctions among persons that
result in their differential faring. The only principled means of addressing that concern, in turn, not only
supply a satisfactory theoretical baseline, but also to render the difference principle itself quite superfluous.
Rawls thus emerges as an unstable resting point en route from naïve to ethically cognizable maximizing –
or what is the same thing, from ethically noncognizable to ethically cognizable equalizing. More infra,
II.D.3, II.D.4, III.A.2.
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distinction of interest to normative distributional evaluation is not “morally arbitrary” –
and surely there must be some that are not if the predicate is to do any work – one would
think it would be that one.
Why, then, do Rawls and other prioritarians not consider such questions in
connection with “the worst-off” and their proposed distribution formulae? No answer is
forthcoming. That is strange and troubling, particularly given Rawls’s own proffered
reasons for abandoning naïve maximizing. For insofar as there is divergence between
those who are responsibly worse-off on the one hand, accidentally worse-off on the other,
maximining looks no less “morally arbitrary” than naïve maximizing. Both maximize
morally arbitrarily; they differ only in maximizing different maximanda. That means in
turn that maximining no more treats distribuees as moral equals and responsible agents
than does maximization.
Almost as if to register that he was at least obliquely aware of these problems,
Rawls’s full theory of appropriate distribution employed two more devices apparently
meant to bring a modicum of responsible agency and equal treatment back into the
account. The first device was the familiar “veil of ignorance” alluded to earlier. Rawls’s
claim here was in effect that distribuees in their roles as distributors, choosing
distribution principles with which they would subsequently have to live as distribuees,
and not knowing ex ante who they would turn out to be ex post in the after-choice polity,
“would” select maximin.82
The veiled choice scenario is of course most immediately prompted by the aim to
ensure ethical equality via anonymity and consequent impartiality: Choosers are
prevented from choosing to benefit themselves over others, because features that
82

The reason for the scare-quotes round “would” will emerge momentarily.
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distinguish them from others are hidden from view behind the veil. What was perhaps
less explicitly recognized, however, was that that veiled choice’s being the product of a
choice scenario would render maximin at least partly a responsible choice as well.
Insofar as it did, choosing agents could appropriately be held to the choice.83 The degree
to which this feature of the scenario explicitly prompted Rawls is unclear. But it is
tempting to suppose that it constituted at least part of its attraction, consciously or
otherwise. That is so partly because of the linkages between ethical equality and
responsible agency noted above. And it is so owing to some of the language Rawls used
in motivating the second responsibility-sensitive wrinkle to which I’ve alluded – Rawls’s
selection of distribuendum. On, now, to that.
The second device by which Rawls in effect partly addressed the responsible
agency and ethical equality problems afflicting his difference principle was his
characterization of the appropriate distribuendum. Rawls prescribed distribution of what
he called “an index of primary goods” – in effect, a lumpy and only incompletely scalable
vector of disparate, broadly conceived resources.84 Rawls was at least partly cognizant of
the agency/equity value that this prescription offered. For, first, his explanations made
some overt reference to the fact that the selection of primary goods as distribuenda
effectively held distribuees partly responsible for the production of their own welfare.85
And second, Rawls expressly noted that treating primary goods as distribuenda required
distribuees to internalize the costs that their lifeplan-rooted preferences for primary goods
83

More corroboration here, I believe, of the deep interconnectedness of ethical equality and
responsible agency noted at various points in the foregoing subsections.
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RAWLS, THEORY, supra note 41 at 54-55, 78-81, 348, 358-65. In light of the incomplete
scalability, of course, the index is but incompletely an index. See supra Part II.C.1. Also Hockett & Risse,
supra note 57.
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Or in Rawls’s preferred idiom, the formulation and successful pursuit of their own “plans of
life.” See THEORY, supra note 41 at 80.
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imposed upon others.86 So Rawls appears, in his brand of veiledly-chosen, primarygoods-distributive maximining, to have been at least an incipient exponent of resourcism
and equal responsible agency.
The problem for Rawls lies in the “incipient” part of that characterization. Note,
first, that primary goods as distribuenda bear no necessary connection to maximin as
distribution formula. Indeed, they amount to little more than a clumsy and ultimately
incoherent graft-on. They render Rawls a responsibility-tracer in respect of his
distribuendum selection, yet a moral accident-allower in his selection of distribution
formula.87 Why? Because the “worst off” in respect even of primary goods holding still
might be poorly off either by chance or by choice.88
The treatment of maximin as a product of veiled choice might, in theory, at least
partly have rectified the unstable mixture just noted. At least this might have been so had
the choice actually been made, or if there were any reason to suppose that it “really
would” have been made. But it is widely understood that the choice theory implied by
Rawls’s selection of maximin as distribution formula is “exotic” to say the least.89 The
choice it imputes is extensionally equivalent, preference-schedule-wise, to such as would
be made only by those who are “infinitely” risk-averse.90 There accordingly seems little
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Id. at 359.
This is not surprising given Rawls’s ambivalence about responsibility. On the one hand, he
defends his selection of primary goods as distribuendum by reference to the importance of responsibility.
On the other hand, at other points he argues deterministically (and confusedly) that people are not
responsible unless able to choose freely, and that they are not able to choose freely because they do not
choose their faculties for choosing. See RAWLS, THEORY, supra note 43 at 90-93, 182. Also infra, note 101
and accompanying text.
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See, e.g., Richard Arneson, Primary Goods Reconsidered, 24 NOÛS 429 (1990). Note that if
leisure were counted a primary good, we wouldn’t even be able to say that those poor in other primary
goods through voluntary nonworking were poorly off at all. See infra note 96.
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See John E. Roemer, Egalitarianism Against the Veil of Ignorance, 99 J. PHIL. 167, 168 (2002).
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See, e.g., Kenneth J. Arrow, Some Ordinalist-Utilitarian Notes on Rawls’s Theory of Justice, 70
J. PHIL. 245, 254 (1973); L. Hurwicz, Optimality Criteria for Decision Making Under Ignorance, 370
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reason to suppose that the choice even “would” be made, let alone that it has been made.
Hence it affords little if any real trace of responsible agency to Rawls’s characterization
of the appropriate distribution formula.
Rawlsian justice theory, then, seems in sum an unstable admixture of
agent/patient, responsibility-tracing/accident-permitting distributive-ethical prescription.
And maximining – the distribution formula that gives partial expression to that mixture –
for its part appears little more free of ethical arbitrariness than the naïve maximizing it is
meant to supplant.

3. Equalizing: Naïve and Sophisticated Varieties
There are a number of influentially proposed egalitarian distribution formulae.
Some of these can usefully be viewed as “purifications” of original Rawlsian insights,
others not. Proposals of the former, sophisticated sort, we shall see later, also are
characterizable as more ethically plausible forms of maximization. Proposals of latter,
naïve variety share flaws with naïve maximizing and Rawlsian prioritarianism that I’ll
draw out below.
The guiding intuition underwriting the more sophisticated proposals can be
articulated thus: Suppose that some differences among persons are both partly causative
of their differential faring and yet “arbitrary from a moral point of view.” Then the most
immediately satisfactory distribution formula would be one that simply partitions each
person’s holdings into portions Ri traceable to moral arbitrariness and 1 – Ri traceable to
responsible agency. It would then mandate equalization of the former, while facilitating
agents’ own maximization of the latter.
STATISTICS 1 (1951); GEOFFREY A. JEHLE & PHILIP J. REMY, ADVANCED MICROECONOMIC THEORY 260
(2d ed. 2001).
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The morally arbitrary portion of any one person’s holdings, Ri, would be
invariantly valued across all persons i. The nonarbitrary portion, call it Ei, would for its
part be permitted – indeed required – to vary across persons according as they expended
varying degrees of responsible effort in productive activities varyingly valued by a
market comprising themselves and others.91 The correct distribution formula accordingly
would be most straightforwardly characterized thus:
∀i: Hi = Ei + Ri = Ei + R/n,
where “∀i” is read “for all i,” “Hi” designates each person i’s holdings, “Ei” and “Ri”
designate what they were said just above to designate, n is the number of persons i,and
“R/n” designates the constant which is each i’s pro rata share of the exogenously given
residuum, R.92
R can be called “luck,” “ethically exogenous resources,” “ethically exogenous
opportunity,” “the exogenous endowment,” “the responsibility-indifferent residuum,” and
so on. Those who would equalize Ri across persons can accordingly be labeled “luckegalitarians,” “resource-egalitarians,” “responsibility-tracing egalitarians,” “opportunityegalitarians,” and so on. I shall call them the latter, for reasons analogous to those
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Leisure in such case would then not count as part of one’s “holdings.” But it could be so
counted. Hence the scare-quotes around “productive,” and the “themselves and” placed before “others” in
the characterization. Were we to count leisure as part of one’s holdings, we then would say that Ei’s
composition, rather than Ei itself, varies across persons i. A consequence would be that maximization of
the full vector of goods one enjoys “takes care of itself,” as a straightforward consequence of responsible
choices made by distribuees as to the disposition of their resource endowments – Ri. Implications of
“varying degrees of responsible effort in activities varyingly valued by themselves and others” are traced
and treated below. The basic idea is that any surplus you end up with over your mandatorily equalized
ethically exogenous endowment is properly a matter of what others give to you in exchange for what you
give to them. This proves particularly important in connection with the treatment of distribution
mechanisms infra, III.B.
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R would be the sum of each person i’s Ri. That is, R = ∑ Ri. Summing here of course requires
commensuration and interpersonal comparability.
1n
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offered above at III.B.3 for treating “resources,” “opportunity for welfare” and “access to
advantage” as all being variants of “material opportunity.”
Most adherents to the opportunity-egalitarian view regard Rawls as having been
an incipient such egalitarian. On this view, Rawls simply had not managed to purge his
views fully of the naïve utilitarian maximization imperative that he sought to replace with
an individualist distributive-ethical ideal. The full purge, this thought would continue, is
that which consistently treats distribuees as boundedly responsible agents, distribuenda as
fully indexed goods and services rather than lumpy Rawlsian “primary goods,” and the
correct distribution formula as that which distributes goods and services in a manner that
is systematically responsive to the cut between faultless chance and responsible choice.
Opportunity-egalitarians are, of course, not without challenges. The mentioned
cut between chance and choice – “Ri” and “Ei” above – for example, can be difficult to
draw, for a number of reasons.93 There also are problems of commensuration such as
plague any mode of distribution that takes heterogeneous material goods and services as
distribuenda. Particularly poignant among the latter is this one: Opportunityegalitarianism confronts all morally arbitrary determinants of wellbeing head-on. But
among such determinants are such deeply “personal” or “internal” resources as talents
and handicaps. This means that to be thoroughgoing and consistent, opportunityegalitarians require some means of commensurating these “personal” – physiologic –
resources and deficits along with all “external” – non-physiologic – such inputs to
welfare functions.94 That looks initially difficult.
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See generally Robert Hockett, Whose Ownership? Which Society?, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 7475 (2005); Robert Hockett, A Jeffersonian Republic by Hamiltonian Means, 79 SO. CAL. L. REV. 45 (2006).
94
This is a challenge, not a fault. The fault lies, on this view, with views that do not so much as
notice that such “resources” are among those that clearly are morally arbitrary.
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It is important, however, to be clear that these challenges amount merely to partial
discounts applied to the unquestioned advantages that the opportunity-egalitarian position
affords. Competing positions – naïve maximizing and maximining – we should
remember, do not so much as attempt to reap those advantages. They remain in
consequence not merely practically, but foundationally short of the unquestioned ideal.
Failure to appreciate this, I think, stems from failure to appreciate that there is an ordered
set of “nth bests” to the opportunity-egalitarian ideal, in a way that there is not in the
cases of naïve and prioritarian maximizing. I’ll show this in Part III, upon turning to
distribution mechanisms..
Two final points should be made in connection with equalization as a proposed
distribution formula: First, the opportunity-egalitarian principle straightforwardly
coheres with the view of distribuees as ethically equal, boundedly responsible agents
discussed above at II.B. It shows better “fit” with that construal of distribuees than do
naïve or prioritarian maximizing – or naïve equalizing, for that matter, as we’ll see
below. It likewise coheres with the view of appropriate distribuenda as material inputs to
individual welfare that distribuees are themselves partly responsible for producing. That
is to say, it better “fits” the construal of appropriate distribuenda as material
opportunities. The same cannot be said for other historically proposed – indeed, “naïve”
– egalitarian distribution formulae, as I’ll now show.
Some utilitarians, for example, have argued for wealth-equalization quite apart
from any consideration of distribuees’ ethical equality or responsibility for wealth- or
welfare-production. They have done so on two conjectured grounds: First, that the
utility functions are roughly the same from person. And second, that the marginal utility
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of wealth is diminishing per those functions. These conjectures, if true, would jointly
entail that rough equalization of holdings would maximize aggregate welfare.
This view treats distribuees as patients just as any other form of utilitarianism
does. It takes us for ethically inert, “automatically” operating welfare manufactories into
which wealth is fed rather like worms into chicks’ beaks. It also, relatedly, treats
distribuees as at best but contingently equal, while more deeply unequal. For distribuees
are treated as “equals” only in respect of a contingently identical feature – again, their
utility functions. Responsibly diligent distribuees, moreover, are expropriated on behalf
of, and thereby conscripted for the purposes of, the non-diligent. For again all that is
treated as mattering is the utility aggregate, not the way in which it is produced. Finally,
this view treats aggregate welfare, not wealth, as distributive focal point.95 In short, then,
it remains a version of naïve maximization, only a contingently (by dint of a posited
accidental feature of utility functions) income-equalizing one.
Non-utilitarian welfare-egalitarians are another group of equalizers who have
historically construed distribuees in effect as patients and thus ethical non-equals. They
have done so by taking the following positions, which jointly, even if unwittingly, entail
the characterization just offered: First, these welfare-egalitarians acknowledge differing
welfare functions across persons. Second, they advocate differential wealth-inputs across
persons in contemplation of that fact, so as to equalize individual welfare-outputs. Third,
in so doing, they hold distribuees entirely unaccountable for their own welfare. And
fourth, in doing that, like the utilitarian and wealth-egalitarians countenanced above, they
effectively accept conscription of the diligent to subsidize even the willfully non-diligent.
95

It is also, of course and in consequence, another case of cart’s being placed before horse. If
wealth-equalizing is sought only by dint of its putative aggregate welfare-maximizing, it is sought in
pursuit of a fetish.
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Some advocates of this position presumably would abandon it were they fully
cognizant of its entailments. Others, perhaps, hold the position in owing to some
confused metaphysical belief about agency: They are determinists, on which view all
persons “really” are patients – patients of God or of fate or of “nature” – through and
through.96
In light of this latter observation, we can see here a sense in which naïve welfareegalitarianism can be reconciled with – or better, be said to amount to a degenerate case
of – the opportunity-egalitarian position: Were it somehow possible, for example, both
intelligibly to maintain and empirically to establish that nobody “really” is responsible for
anything, then welfare-egalitarianism would extensionally coincide with opportunityegalitarianism: One would simply set Ei trivially at zero for all values of i in the formula
set out above. This would formulaically express the idea of no one’s “really” being
responsible for anything, including for any portion of her own holdings. There would
then be no ethical point in distinguishing between opportunity-input and welfare-output.
I mention this prospect, however, as a mere theoretical curio. I don’t see how the
antecedent conditions – establishing that we are not “really” responsible for anything –
could be satisfactorily satisfied. Even so much as to articulate the position would seem to
be self-refuting.
Symmetrical remarks, incidentally, would hold of welfare-maximizing
utilitarianism as described above in II.C.2: Were it plausible to hold persons responsible
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I admit to finding it difficult to make sense of this position. By its own criteria it would be
prompted in the saying by metaphysical necessity rather than the proponent’s free acceptance of the truth.
We who hear the claim likewise will do what ever we do as mere effects of the same occult causes rather
than in response to reasons. Reason-giving itself, such as determinist claims amount to, seem to
presuppose freedom of the only kind that matters – that which underwrites attribution of responsibility. But
alas, I must leave the free will problem there for the present.
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for everything rather than nothing – even the entireties of their utility functions97 – then
we might set Ri trivially at zero for all values of i in the above-stated opportunityegalitarian formula in recognition of that “fact.” Persons i would be treated as equals by
dint of their each counting for one and there being no ethically exogenous residuum, for
which they were not responsible, to be spread objectionably unequally.98 Again there
would be no more point in distinguishing between opportunity-input and welfare-output.
Once again, however, the antecedent condition here – distribuees’ being responsible for
everything – looks impossible to maintain.99 We seem to be stuck with the cut – that
between chance and choice – recognizition of which is opportunity-egalitarianism’s
theoretic blessing and (largely surmountable) pragmatic curse.100
A final point that bears noting in connection with equalization has to do with the
latter’s relation to fairness. “Fairness,” on all semantically informed understandings of
the word, connotes impartiality or even-handedness:101 Commonly proffered synonyms
of “fair” include “equitable,” “just,” “impartial,” “unbiased,” “even-handed,” “treating
like cases alike,” and the like.102 To treat parties fairly is to treat them as equals for
purposes of the treatment. It is to eliminate or neutralize inequities that are exogenous to
the purposes of the treatment, and to retain or vindicate inequities that are endogenous to
the purposes of the treatment – precisely in proportion to their endogeneity.
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On such a view you could presumably be held responsible for your forehead height too. You’d
be responsible for everything. Hence you could be identified with everything. Another reason here, I
suppose, to call people like the early utilitarian Sidgwick “eyes of the universe.” See BART SCHULTZ,
HENRY SIDGWICK: EYE OF THE UNIVERSE, AN INTELLECTUAL BIOGRAPHY (2004).
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Neither Schopenhauer nor Nietzsche managed to pull it off, for example. And Pangloss of
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“Largely surmountable,” again, for reasons that emerge infra, Part III.
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definition in the book cited supra, note 1.
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Say, for example, that the purpose of the treatment in a particular context is to
distribute in accordance with responsible human agency and nothing else – i.e., no
morally arbitrary feature of the distribuees. Then fair treatment in this context will be
that which allocates value to distribuees in proportion to their creditability for valueproduction.103 It will also, then, a fortiori, be treatment that equally allocates value for
the production of which no one is responsible, since everyone is equally responsible for
that residuum. (Zero equals zero, across the full population.) Fair allocations, in short,
will be those that equalize holdings of such stuff as no one is responsible for, and require
holdings for which persons are in fact responsible to vary in proportion to their
responsibility. If this is so, then the class of fair allocations would seem to be precisely
the class of opportunity-egalitarian allocations.

4. Interformulability
The immediately foregoing discussion of distribution formulae suggests an
obvious formal means of rendering the point with which I introduced this Article. I said
that to maximize one thing is to distribute another thing and to equalize yet another thing
– the latter thing amounting, in turn, to some attribute with which we identify distribuees.
The observation made just above, that certain equalization formulae can be construed as
degenerate cases of maximization formulae and vice versa, amounts to a further
corroboration of the point. Let us now generalize it formulaically.
The following translation rule captures the basic idea. For any aggregative
maximizing imperative of the form:
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“In proportion to … creditability for value-production” requires, if it is to bear content,
commensuration of disparate items and services, then cardinal valuation of agents’ inputs along the
resultant index. We’ll get to that infra, III.B.
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Max ∑ ui,
in which u-factors are summed, simply translate the summand, ui, into its counterpart
equalisand, ui*, and state the imperative thus:
∀i: Eq (ui*),
where “∀i” is read, “for all i,” and “Eq” means to “Equalize” just as “Max” means to
“Maximize.” In short, rather than summing u factors and maximizing the sum, we enjoin
functionaries, equivalently, to equalize the summand’s egalitarian counterpart, u*. Since
there is always a counterpart, we always can work the translation.104
Two brief, concrete examples will make the point plain. Suppose first we are
garden variety utilitarians. We accordingly wish to maximize aggregate utility. We aim,
then, to maximize the sum of ui measures over individuals i. The summand in this case is
each individual’s “welfare,” or “utility” measure, as ordinarily construed by utilitarians.
That summand’s egalitarian counterpart, u*, is clear here: It is what summing utilitarians
call “weighting” in determining the utility aggregate. Each individual’s utility function
receives equal weight in the social welfare function, a weight of one. That weighting is
accordingly what the social welfare function equalizes. Precisely this point is what
underwrites some utiltiarians’ claim to be egalitarian, as we noted earlier.105
What these same utilitarians appear not to have noticed is this: That feature in
virtue of which a social welfare function treats individuals as equals – their utility
functions – is also the attribute with which those who act in conformity with the function
104

Though of course conceptual and idiomatic dexterity would be required in many cases, in some
of which there would be little more than theoretical interest in the translation exercise.
105
See supra, note 17, and associated text.
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identify or “count” individuals for policy purposes. The social welfare function
“reduces” counted individuals to their utility functions. That reduction might not cohere
very well with our view of distribuees if, say, we construe them as boundedly responsible
agents per the emergent consensus discussed above in II.B. This points the way to a
second example that can instructively be compared to the utilitarian.
Suppose we object, then, to utilitarianism by dint of the way it construes us in our
capacity as distribuees. What it had set before us to maximize – “utility” – sounded
inoffensive enough on first blush, if for no other reason that it was vague and mysterious.
But then we find, on analysis, that what it effectively tells us to equalize and identify
ourselves with is out of sync with what we know ourselves to be. It misidentifies that
feature of ourselves in virtue of which we legally and politically matter. How, then, to
give formal expression to our amended view of what law and policy should be directed
toward?
Here is the proverbial kicker: We can give formal expression to what we take for
a more satisfactory legal and policy imperative in precisely the same schematic terms as
the utilitarian did. We simply convert what we take for the more appropriate form of
individual-identification and equalization – i.e., the better construal of distribuees and
distribuenda – into a maximizing formula. We proceed, that is to say, from u* to u in this
case, simply reversing the order by which we arrived at utilitarianism’s de facto u* in
analyzing its maximized sum of u’s.
Let’s trace the steps. Suppose we are opportunity-egalitarians, per II.C.3. We
wish, then, to equalize the distribuendum discussed at II.A.3 – material opportunity –
over distribuees whom we take for boundedly responsible agents, per II.B.1. The latter
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are people who actively transform opportunities into welfare. Note now that in
transforming their opportunities into welfare, these agents are in aggregate generating a
form of social welfare. It is what we can call “equal-opportunity-grounded welfare.”
The latter, then, is precisely what we seek to see maximized, is it not? It is that
maximandum which corresponds to what we take for the appropriate equalisandum. The
only difference between this form of welfare and that of which utilitarians speak is that
this form proceeds from antecedent conditions of equal opportunity and is produced in
part by responsible agents.106 Utilitarian welfare, by contrast, is indifferent to the
opportunity backdrop and to the responsible agency of distribuees. Its welfare aggregate
is accordingly differently generated, and is in that sense a different species of welfare
aggregate. Process is partly constitutive of product, we might say.107
This all suggests that the formal renditions of utilitarian and opportunityegalitarian norms can be rendered schematically identical, hence are themselves
structurally identical. They are isomorphic. Only the particular valuations given the
schematic variables u and u* above vary between them. Both equalize u* over
individuals, and both maximize the sum of individual u-measures. They differ only in
respect of what they equalize and maximize.
Where they differ is, first, in utilitarianism’s calling u* the weighting assigned to
individuals’ exogenously endowed, birth-conferred utility functions; while opportunityegalitarianism calls u* the material opportunity afforded those same individuals. They
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The role played by the agents in generating the aggregate, in turn, suggests that our task as an
operational matter is to equalize opportunity, leaving the transformation of that opportunity into welfare to
the distribuees. “Leave the driving to us,” the distribuees might say. More on this infra, Part III, in
connection with distribution mechanisms.
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The description under which the product in question is individuated, that is, includes essential
reference to the generation-process. Process is “internal” to product in such case. See supra, note 9.
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differ, second, in utilitarianism’s calling the u whose sum over individuals is to be
maximized “utility,” a measure that is indifferent to individuals’ agency, responsibility,
or opportunity; while opportunity-egalitarianism calls that u “equal-opportunitygrounded” welfare, a measure that is not thus indifferent.
The important point, then, is that both maximize something, both equalize
something, and in both cases we can on pain of incoherence take the maximandum to be
the right thing to maximize if and only if we take the equalisandum to be the right thing
to equalize. It is worth noting a corollary while we are at it here: There is much
unnecessary confusion in the theoretical literature concerning a putative distinction
between the so-called “consequentialist” nature of maximizing imperatives on the one
hand, the “deontological” nature of fairness – i.e., equalizing – imperatives on the
other.108 It even is claimed sometimes, surprisingly, that norms of the latter sort are
inherently “ex post” in orientation, while those of the former sort are more “ex ante” in
orientation.109 The ready interformulability of equalizing and maximizing formulae
immediately suggests that this distinction is arbitrary. It is no more than an artifact of the
symbolism we happen to employ.
This suggestion is borne out by the following consideration: “Deontology” refers
simply to the logic – the form, or structure – of duty. “Consequentialism” refers simply
to the belief that consequences matter. All imperatives, whether cast in maximization or
equalization terms, are laid down as duties: Functionaries are obligated to “Max” this or
“Eq” that. The duties, in turn, speak to consequences. Utilitarianism lays down a duty to
seek this consequence: A maximized aggregate that is the sum of equally weighted
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A case in point is Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 1.
Id.
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individual utility measures. Opportunity-egalitarianism lays down a schematically
identical duty to seek this substantively alternative consequence: A fair distribution of
material opportunity such as results in a maximized aggregate of equal-opportunitygrounded welfare. Both norms are as “consequentialist” as they are deontic; they simply
articulate duties to seek different consequences.110
As for the putatively “ex post” orientation of “deontological” norms and “ex ante”
orientation of “consequentialist” norms, it is difficult to know what to make of the claim.
I doubt sense can be made of it. I note, though, that opportunity-egalitarianism speaks
directly to the ex ante spread of opportunity, thereafter allowing the ex post equalopportunity-grounded welfare aggregate “take care of itself.” It does so precisely
because it is for agent distribuees to produce that aggregate out of the antecedent
opportunity spread. Utilitarianism, by contrast, speaks directly to the ex post welfare
aggregate, without regard for the ex ante spread of opportunity over responsible agents.
Things look to be quite the reverse, then, of how they have been characterized, assuming
I’ve managed to make sense of the characterization.

III. DISTRIBUTION MECHANISMS
I noted earlier that “to distribute” is subject to two forms of adverbial
modification. One is by “ought” adverbs, which implicate distribution formulae as
discussed just above. The other is by “can” adverbs, which implicate feasible distribution
mechanisms, hence institutions and laws. We proceed now to the latter. Treatment of
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The term “consequentialism” as a name for utilitarian and cognate maximizing imperatives
seems to have been introduced by G.E.M. Anscombe, Modern Moral Philosophy, 33 PHIL. 1 (1958).
Anscombe was, to be sure, a remarkably penetrating thinker. But it is tempting in hindsight to conclude
that her singling out ethical systems by reference to their attention to consequences has ultimately led to
more muddling mischief than salutary clarification
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this subject receives a Part of its own because it is here, as we’ll see, that the more
“purely” theoretic concerns of Part II find detailed application. In turning to distribution
mechanisms we move from “Grundnorms” to specifically legal norms – the stuff of
statutes, regulations, and judicial decisions.
One might imagine many means by which to effect distributions of benefit and
burden. Such means might be specified, in turn, at varying levels of abstraction. The
possibilities here run from micro-detailed description of existing institutions, on up to the
quite broadly schematized, variably instantiable designs contemplated in axiomatic
mechanism theory.111 Surprisingly, most normatively oriented legal and policy analysts
have been quiet on the subject of feasible distribution mechanisms. That’s regrettable for
at least two reasons. For one thing, “can” limits “ought,” as is commonly recognized.
Hence “ought” claims that ignore “can” limitations risk being merely idle. But for
another thing, some “can”s render some “ought”s particularly attractive. They do so not
merely by rendering option menus more manageable via elimination of non-feasible
alternatives. They do so also by highlighting ways we can sidestep even some theoretic
conundrums, as I shall demonstrate.
One distribution mechanism that I shall specify appears to “fit” the most
acceptable conceptions of distributor, distribuendum, distribuee and distribution formula
discussed above in Part II very gracefully and, as it happens, uniquely. That renders
those conceptions more attractive on feasibility grounds, of course. But it also does more
than that. The process of schematizing and justifying this mechanism further illuminates
why those conceptions are independently attractive in the first place.
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See, e.g., L. Billera & R. Bixby, A Characterization of Pareto Surfaces, 41 PROC. AM. MATH.
SOC’Y 261 (1973); E. Kalai & M. Smorodinsky, Other Solutions to Nash’s Bargaining Problem, 43
ECONOMETRICA 513 (1975).
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I’ll begin, then, by first briefly characterizing the rough-hewn, composite
mechanism-type that seems to be taken for granted as background condition by most
normative legal and policy analysts. It amounts to a vaguely specified mélange of
decentralized market allocation, partly centralized private law rights-vindication by
courts, and more centralized ad hoc intervention by legislatures and regulatory
authorities. I then briefly demonstrate a broad normative gulf running between this
composite and most of the Part II-assessed theories that seem to assume it. Those
theories, that is to say, are not equipped to underwrite specific prescriptions concerning
what precise shape the composite should take.
Once I have shown this, I’ll show that one normative vision discussed in Part II –
the opportunity-egalitarian ideal – does recommend a particular, detailed configuration
that the composite mechanism should take. Indeed, I maintain, this configuration seems
even to constitute the institutional ideal toward which our more public good oriented
legal, policy, and institutional designing is directed. The mechanism that’s actually
prescribed in detail by a Part II distributive ethic, that is, is an ideal toward which we
appear to have been striving, with varying degrees of awareness, all along. I’ll call it the
ideal of an “efficient, democratically regulated, endowment-neutral market.”

A. Mechanisms, Laws, Governments
First, then, the rough-hewn composite to which I’ve referred: Most who speak
normatively in respect of distributive questions take the following for granted: First, that
most of the material things that matter to people – the “resources” or “material
opportunities” of II.B above – are distributed by various forms of private bequest and
exchange. Second, that the latter presuppose antecedently defined private law rights
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sounding in civil obligation – property, contract and tort – that are vindicable in courts.
And third, that these rights are in turn subject to occasional amendment or alteration by
centralized legislative action. Things seldom grow more fine-grained than this.112
What ever the reasons for or causes of this want of detail, the consequences of
mechanism-nonspecification are vitiating. And not simply implementation-wise
vitiating, but indeed theory-vitiating. For distributive-theory-building just is, in its
actuating ambition, institution-designing. Without imagining in some detail what the
“outward expression” of prescriptive theory would look like, one remains unclear about
what actually is being prescribed. It is as though one were attempting to think without
language. Thought itself is left lumpy, ill-formed, inchoate. The full content’s not
there.113 We find this in all of the leading distributive-ethical theories currently on offer.
What is missing in these theories comes to light most starkly precisely when we ask what
it would be to instantiate them. We can see this quite readily by briefly considering the
best known such theories – those considered above in Part II under the other distributive
categories.

1. All Dressed Up and No Place to Go: Utilitarianism
Consider first utilitarianism – i.e., naïve welfare maximization. Collecting the
information assembled in Part II, we know that a utilitarian polity will wish to aggregate
its patient-distribuees’ unweighted welfare outputs and maximize the resultant sum. It
will, moreover, be willing to do so “by any means necessary.” For the utility aggregate is
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For example, not one of the sources cited supra, Part II describes or prescribes any distribution
mechanism in more detail than just sketched.
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Similar concerns animate Joseph Carens’s and Robert Goodin’s interesting work on
institutional design. See JOSEPH CARENS, EQUALITY, EFFICIENCY AND THE MARKET (1990); ROBERT
GOODIN, THE THEORY OF INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN (1998).
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the sole normative touchstone guiding utilitarian policy, both as a matter of personal and
of political morality.
But now consider: First, in view of the difficulties noted in II.C to afflict direct
welfare-measurement, it is indeterminate what means would suffice or be necessary. If
you cannot know when utility is maximized, can you know what to do in order to
maximize it? Notwithstanding that inconvenient question, the utilitarian will regard a
high degree of centralized government action as warranted and probably even required.
For he will consider such authority to be necessary both for the regular collection of
utility data and for the regular redistribution of holdings in order to maintain a maximal
aggregate utility reading. And he will take the utilitarian planner to be unconstrained by
any rights held antecedently by citizens.114 The latter are utility-factories, not
autonomous rights-bearing agents.
What is one to make of so dystopian and incoherent a picture? A government
stunningly empowered in principle, which for theoretical reasons nevertheless literally
could not actually perform the function upon which that surprising degree of power is
predicated: All dressed up and no place to go. In view of such difficulties as these,
which are not merely implementary but foundational, utilitarianism looks to be a
nonstarter where determinate distributive-ethical prescribing is concerned. Its noninstantiability does not point toward a “second best.” Rather, the reasons for its nonimplementability reveal a sense in which it is not even a merely accidentally non-
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This is not even the mention redistribution’s effects on effort-expense, hence goods and
services production, hence the size of the utility aggregate itself. In view of utility’s functioning as a fetish,
incidentally, the need of an extensive governmental apparatus should not be surprising. In effect, the utility
aggregate is a contemporary analogue to the pyramids of Egypt and the ziggurats of Mesopotamia and
Mesoamerica. Societies organized around such monistic and inhuman pursuits have historically been both
theocratic and autocratic.
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implementable “first best” – or even so much as a specified “good”: It is prescriptively
sterile or stillborn au fond, while its advocates’ leaving the mechanism variable unvalued
has served to conceal the fact.

2. More Tastefully Dressed, Still No Destination: Rawlsian Justice
Observations reminiscent of those made in connection with utilitarianism hold of
Rawlsian justice theory as well. Rawls himself was refreshingly candid about this. He
admitted that his concern was solely with what he called “the basic structure” of a just
society. The problem, alas, is that the structure he seems to have had in mind is so basic
that we don’t know what Rawlsian principles have to say about matters as “basic” as a
society’s constitutional order itself, let alone subsequent legislation and private law
doctrine.
Rawls left such matters for what he called “later stages” of polity-constituting,
with which his work was said not to be immediately concerned. There seems to have
been a rough expectation that there would be property rights and market exchange.115
But Rawls claimed his principles would be realizable in socialist societies as well.116 We
are accordingly left to wonder how Rawls’s principles might so much as even begin to be
operationalized. This raises a worry that the principles as articulated impart no
determinate prescriptive information. Note further that this is a worry that already arose
earlier, in connection with the indeterminacy of “the worst off class” in Rawls’s
prescribed distribution formula.
As in the case of utilitarianism, then, so here we find the lack of attention paid
questions of mechanism not simply leaving implementary and “second best” questions
115
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RAWLS, THEORY, supra note 43 at 52.
Id. at 55.

68

unanswered: Rawls allows even the matter of “first bests” to remain undetectedly
underspecified. We are left wondering whether there’s any “here” here. The theory so
underdetermines its own implementation that we don’t know what to make of the theory
itself – or, perhaps better put, what to make with it. How much is it actually telling us if
it is equally realizable in any number of possible polities with radically divergent
property, tort, contract, and other legal arrangements? Put differently, how do we
recognize a Rawlsian society upon seeing one?

3. Locally Determinate, Globally Indeterminate Prescription:
Normative “Law & Economics”
Apart from the opportunity-egalitarian mechanism I’ll schematize below in III.B,
the only serious mechanism-proposals one finds in the distribution-concerned legal and
policy literatures is that done by normative economists of law.117 Unlike utilitarians and
Rawlsians, these analysts generally attend carefully to micro-institutional detail. Indeed
their bailiwick is precisely the Kaldor-Hicksian wealth-aggregate effects wrought by
alternative choices available at the simplest unit of institutional structure – the rule. Yet
by what might at first blush seem a curious irony, this is precisely their undoing from a
distribution mechanism point of view. In the end there is less irony here than at first
might appear, however. For the problem stems ultimately from a gap between macroobjective and micro-detail akin to that I’ve just noted in Rawls.118
The foundational mechanism problem for mainstream economics of law is rooted
in a fallacy of composition: Suppose that each of n rules Ra/1, Ra/2,… Ra/n tends, within
the confines of its particular domain 1, 2, …or n, to be wealth-maximizing in comparison
117

That is, practitioners of normative “law and economics.”
Rawls ignored micro for macro, at macro’s expense. Normative economics of law ignores
macro, we’ll see, at micro’s expense.
118
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to its envisaged competitors b, c, d, etc. in that domain.119 It does not follow from this
that the full vector of rules Ra/1 … Ra/n will be wealth-maximizing as compared, say, to
some other vector Rb/1 … Rb/n that would come to the theorist’s mind only were he to
contemplate a fuller institutional backdrop. The latter is be a backdrop that simply is not
on the agenda when all that is being asked is which of Ra/1, Rb/1, …Rm/1 is wealthmaximizing in domain 1 considered in isolation. And this is what practitioners of
normative economics of law do: They consider domains one at a time, without reference
to other domains or to interactions between domains.
But realistically speaking, choices in nominally distinct domains 1 … n cannot
reasonably be expected to be linearly independent, as any student of general equilibrium
theory – or, for that matter, of the proverbial “seamless web of the law” – will
recognize.120 Rules within one domain will affect the distributive consequences wrought
by rules in other domains. It will accordingly again be illicit to conclude from Ra/1’s
dominating Rb/1 in domain 1 that the full vector Ra/1 … Ra/n dominates Rb/1 … Rb/n, let
alone any other available vectors Rm/n.
There is, then, a foundational gap in mainline economics of law between
normative ideal – wealth-maximization – in macro, and mechanism-evaluative practice –
rule-evaluation – in micro. The gap here, moreover, is inherently unbridgeable, not
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Think of a “particular domain” as, for example, the question of what kinds of damages ought
be available for a particular tort, or what rules should constitute the “consideration” regime in contract, or
what should be required of pleadings in suits brought in fraud, etc. I designate such domains here with
numerals – 1, 2, 3, etc., on up to n. I am then designating alternative proposed rules within domains by
lower case letters commencing with a. If 1 is the domain of contract remedies, then, and a is specific
performance, b is liquidated damages, c is compensatory damages, etc. in that domain, then the rules to that
effect are here designated Ra/1, Rb/1, etc. Shift to another domain 2 – e.g., remedies for battery – and lay
out another menu of options a, b, c, etc., and there will be rules with names Rb/1, Rb/2, etc.
120
Indeed normative “law and economics,” like much of the Marshallian/Pigouvian (as
distinguished from Walrasian) welfare economics from which it descends, is confined to partial equilibrium
modes of analysis.

70

merely accidentally unbridged. There is, that is to say, a reason that normative
economists of law consider domains in isolation rather than in aggregate, in such manner
as leaves them speechless as to what the macro-social distribution of entitlements ought
to be. The reason is that normative economics of law’s guiding ideal – Kaldor-Hicksian
“wealth-maximization” – is itself normatively indeterminate in macro.121 One simply
cannot prescribe an initial distribution of entitlements on the basis of that distribution’s
effect upon total “wealth.”
Why? Because “wealth” as the name of a putative mechanism-maximizable
maximandum cannot be so much as defined until after an assignment of legal
entitlements has already been carried out. This is not an empirical accident; it is a
conceptual, definitional truth. There is no concept of “wealth” that is understandable
apart from an antecedent distribution of entitlements.122 Hence there is no “wealth”
aggregate to employ as a normative touchstone in deciding how best to distribute those
entitlements.123 That means that normative economics of law cannot prescribe a macrodistribution of legal entitlements.124 It is, in the end, as prescriptively sterile as are
utilitarianism and Rawlsianism.
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The seminal articles from which the pseudo-normative concept of Kaldor-Hicksian “wealth”
derives are Nicholas Kaldor, Welfare Propositions of Economics and Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility,
49 ECON. J. 549 (1939); and John R. Hicks, Foundations of Welfare Economics, 49 ECON. J. 696 (1939).
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The matter is ably treated in Coleman, supra note 91.
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This is, in effect, normative economics of law’s manifestation of welfare economics’
“Scitovsky Paradox” – the possibility for two states of the world to be Kaldor-Hicks superior to one
another. See Scitovsky, supra note 91 and associated text. Note that utility, were it measurable, would not
be vulnerable on this score, even though it would be fetishist for reasons given supra, II.C.
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Posner, to his credit, accepted criticism to this effect early on. He then went on blithely to
observe that the problem did not afflict what I am here calling the “micro” choice problem of selecting
between possible rules within a single, more limited domain. But that is precisely what I am claiming here
to be the problem for normative economics of law from a mechanism-prescriptive point of view. If the
macro backdrop must be normatively evaluated but is literally unevaluable by one’s normative theory,
one’s micro-critiques have not been made normatively intelligible. See the ensuing paragraphs.
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This fact is masked solely by dint of normative economics of law’s restricting its
attentions to micro-distributions. Our attentions are deflected away from the macrodistribution, hence from the fact that normative economics of law is conceptually
incapable of evaluating that distribution, hence in turn from the fact that normative
economics of law cannot intelligibly evaluate micro-distributions either. Where macroevaluation is impossible, micro-evaluations lack ultimate normative content. They are in
consequence normatively uninteresting.
The reason is that they are conducted by reference to a normatively arbitrary
aggregate – the special form of “wealth” invented by normative economics of law itself.
That aggregate is normatively arbitrary because produced by normatively arbitrary
means. It is produced by normatively arbitrary means because it is produced against a
normatively arbitrary backdrop – i.e., on the basis of a normatively arbitrary antecedent
distribution of entitlements which, again, normative economics of law simply lacks the
conceptual resources to evaluate and make recommendations about. The “wealth” of
normative economics of law is accordingly no more ethically interesting than, say, the
aggregate of “forehead height” countenanced above in the Introduction.
Yet again, then, insufficient attention paid to the unseverable coupling of practical
distribution mechanism to others of distribution’s more “purely theoretical,” grammaropened variables results in a theory-vitiating blindspot. We fail to notice that certain
would-be distributive prescriptions are not merely difficult to implement, but in fact
misfire at the stage of prescription itself. We get nowhere – we don’t even point
anywhere – until we work completely to specify valuations of all of the variables opened
by distributive infinitives at once.
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B. One Satisfactory Mechanism
The previous subsection might seem to underwrite pessimism. One might fear,
given the failings of normative distributional theories thus far even to come close to
prescribing determinate distribution mechanisms, that the problem is simply intractable.
But fear not. There is a mechanism that determinately realizes the best vector of values
proffered in Part II to fill the distributive variables. Intriguingly, moreover, this fact does
not seem to be mere happy accident: The “how”s of this mechanism’s vindicating the
best valuations illumine yet further the independent attractiveness of those valuations
themselves. That’s an attraction additional to the practical advantages offered by this
mechanism’s capacity to realize the best valuations. What is more, I shall indicate, our
laws, policies, and institutions appear to be animated, at least inchoately, by a shared
societal commitment to realizing precisely this mechanism.

1. One Fully Specifiable Mechanism: Real Opportunity-Spreading
Here, first in idealized form, is the mechanism that I have in mind: Begin by
assuming, for heuristic purposes, a “complete” market. That is a forum in which all and
only desired, voluntary trading occurs.125 Assume that this trading is in, first, all goods
and services that can practically be made available and that anyone values. These, then,
125

Market “completeness” in this sense includes trading in contingent claims, more on which over
the course of the next several paragraphs. I’ll also argue that completeness in this sense is a function, in
part, of what I shall presently label “neutrality,” a fact which appears to go largely ignored. The classic
sources on the role of contingent claims in completing markets are JOHN R. HICKS, VALUE AND CAPITAL
(1940); Maurice Allais, Généralisation des Théories de L’Equilibre Economique Général et du Rendement
Social au Cas du Risque 11 ECONOMETRIE, COLLOQUES INTERNATIONAUX DU CENTRE NATIONAL DE LA
RECHERCHE SCIENTIFIQUE 81(1953); Kenneth J. Arrow, Le Rôle de Valeurs Boursières par la Répartition
la Meilleure des Risques, 11 ECONOMETRIE, COLLOQUES INTERNATIONAUX DU CENTRE NATIONAL DE LA
RECHERCHE SCIENTIFIQUE 41 (1953); and GERARD DEBREU, THEORY OF VALUE (1954). Completeness is
more precisely characterized by formal means. Its presence bears many ramifications, only some of which
can be treated here. For fuller treatment, see Robert Hockett, Just Insurance Through Global MacroHedging, 25 U. PA. J. INT’L. ECON. L. 107 (2004). For state of the art plenary treatment, see MICHAEL
MAGILL & MARTINE QUINZII, THEORY OF INCOMPLETE MARKETS I (1996).
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would be in the terms of II.C above all things that are intelligible as normatively
interesting distribuenda.126 Assume that the trading is in, second, “Arrow securities.”
These are contingent claims to compensation upon the occurrence of such eventualities as
distribuees might disvalues. The compensation is payable by anyone willing to take the
opposite sides of what amount to “bets” on the disvalued contingencies.127
Assume next that the market I describe also is “neutral.” It is neutral first in this
sense: Each participant enters it with an initial endowment of ethically exogenous assets
– i.e., the “material opportunities” of II.C.2 – equal in value to that with which everyone
else enters it. Call this form of neutrality entry neutrality.
The market I have in mind also is neutral in a second sense: Regulatory norms
prevent such collusively, strategically, or expropriatively opportunistic behaviors as can
yield a particular consequence: Namely, some participants’ coming to possess greater or
lesser holdings, or price-affecting effective demand powers, than are traceable solely to
(a) the participants’ ethically exogenous initial endowments, and (b) their ethically
endogenous – i.e., responsible – transaction histories. Call this form of neutrality process
neutrality.128
This mechanism strait-forwardly instantiates a particular set of valuations of the
distributive variables discussed above at II.A through II.D. It also, simultaneously,
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Assume also, for obvious reasons, that valued “goods” and “services” do not include among
them the nonconsensual expropriation of others’ entitlements, which would violate the neutrality conditions
I next describe. I’ll also explain how to apportion and determine entitlements, hence what counts as
expropriation.
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See sources cited supra, note 121, in particular Hockett. See also Robert Hockett, Gaming as
Micro-Insurance: How and Why to Regulate, not Eliminate, Online Gambling (manuscript under review,
on file with the author).
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Please set aside, just for the moment, the questions of means by which endowments would be
measured and endowment-equalization effected. We’ll get to those shortly.
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sidesteps the three critical measurement concerns discussed at II.C, in a manner that no
other mechanism so much as begins to attempt.
First those valuations of the distributive variables: Note first that the mechanism
honors distribuees as boundedly responsible agents, as characterized above in II.B.1.
Distribuees transact voluntarily pursuant to their own, autonomous relative valuations of
material goods, ills, and contingencies that they prefer and disprefer. What they hold or
enjoy at any given moment is, moreover, a function of those same autonomous
valuational and transacting decisions.
Note next that the mechanism treats as distribuenda what ever non-neutralityviolative goods or services, including risk-bearing services, the agent-distribuees
themselves value or disvalue. These goods and services are the resources or material
opportunities countenanced above in II.C.2 and II.C.3. They are that from which, in
conjunction with their choices, agent-distribuees’ welfares derive.
Note finally that the mechanism, via the entry neutrality imposed upon it at the
outset and the process neutrality retained throughout, equalizes what is ethically
exogenous – that which is not traceable in the holding directly to a responsible choice.
At the same time, it allows holdings over time to vary with ethically endogenous – i.e.,
responsible – transactional and other decisions. The distribution formula to which the
mechanism gives expression, then, is the opportunity-egalitarian formula characterized
above in II.D.3.
Now the measurement challenges: Note first that the mechanism sidesteps, in an
ethically satisfactory way, the problem of cardinal welfare measurement discussed at
II.C.1. It does so by enabling agent-distribuees, via their voluntary trading activity, to
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maximize welfare in a manner consistent with two conceptually equivalent, normatively
required conditions: First, ethically exogenous endowment equality among market
participants, per the opportunity-egalitarian requirement characterized in II.D.3. And
hence second, by way of corollary, an equally shared scarcity of the exogenously given
resources from which agents “produce” their own welfare.129 Note that the maximization
of this, normatively intelligible form of welfare130 is effectively “guaranteed” to occur:
That is a straight-forward entailment of the “first fundamental theorem of welfare
economics”131
Now note that, similarly, the mechanism unobjectionably sidesteps the problem of
interpersonal welfare comparison discussed at II.C.1. So long as the material opportunity
components of welfare-manufacture132 are counted133 among the exogenous endowments
that must be equalized over participants, the following will hold true: What ever the
absolute or comparative quanta of welfare enjoyed by distribuees, these will be the
“highest” that they can be consistent with Part II.D.3’s opportunity-egalitarian
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In essence, we are describing an economy characterized by so-called “equal division Walrasian
equilibria,” or “EDWEs.” The technical literature on the theory of EDWEs and fair allocation more
generally is vast, though curiously ignored by economically oriented legal academics. A canonical
sampling would include: T.E. Daniel, A Revised Concept of Distributional Equity, 11 J. ECON. THEORY 94
(1975); Duncan Foley, Resource Allocation and the Public Sector, YALE ECON. ESSAYS 7, at 45-98 (1967);
E.A. Pazner & David Schmeidler, Egalitarian-Equivalent Allocations: A New Concept of Economic Equity,
92 Q.J. ECON. 1 (1978); Elisha Pazner & David Schmeidler, A Difficulty in the Concept of Fairness, 41
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distribution formula and the consequently equally shouldered constraints posed by the
exogenously given environment.
Finally, the mechanism “automatically” commensurates distribuenda, per the
discussion of II.C.2, in the only way that ethically matters: That is via the implicit
comparative valuations of autonomously transacting agent-distribuees.134 We need not,
that is to say, concern ourselves with how much of some good G2 “would” or will
compensate person P1 for a deficit of good G1, let alone seek to construct a
“perfectionist” index of all such goods and ills.135 Our distribuees themselves will, in
effect, autonomously and with equal voice construct the only normatively salient index –
in effect, a spontaneously emergent price index. And so long as entry and process
neutrality are maintained, this latter amounts to the ethically relevant “social” valuation
of goods and ills. That is a valuation in the construction of which each participant has
exercised, by dint of neutrality itself, an equal “vote.”136

2. Instantiability-Challenges & Ordered “Nth Bests”
The opportunity-egalitarian market mechanism, then, insofar as it can be
instantiated, simultaneously assists in realizing what looks to be the most plausible vector
of Part II distributive values, while meeting or neutralizing each of the principal
measurement challenges. The ways in which it does so, moreover, serve to reinforce the
independent normative-theoretic attractiveness of the indicated Part II values themselves
134

See Hockett & Risse, supra note 97.
Id. The claim that the need to index commits one to perfectionism – the proposition that some
goods are inherently more worthy of collective pursuit than others – figures into a prominent criticism of
Rawlsian primary goods leveled by Arneson. See Richard Arneson, Primary Goods Reconsidered, 24
NOÛS 429 (1990). The criticism is addressed in Hockett & Risse, id.
136
Again, provided that there exist market completeness and neutrality in the senses explicated
above. Trading here is voting, and voting rights are equally spread in the only sense that ethically matters –
equal bargaining power involving the apposite form of equality, viz., equality of ethically exogenous
endowments.
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– distributors and distribuees as boundedly responsible agents, distribuenda as material
opportunities, and distribution formula as opportunity-egalitarian.
Three obstacles, however, might seem to stand in the way of the mechanism’s
realization. Dispatching them will be necessary if we are to be confident that
opportunity-egalitarianism is any more practicable, or even prescriptively determinate,
than its competitors addressed in III.A. The process of addressing the challenges,
however, ends up affording affirmative advantages as well. For in addressing them we
come to notice a number of other things.
Among the things worthy of notice are the following: First, that the mechanism
actually amounts to a normative refinement and completion of the mechanism
unsatisfactorily and incompletely specified by mainline economics of law. Second, that
the mechanism is progressively instantiable over time, in a manner that ordinally
replicates a normative scale from “nth best” to “first best.” Third, that our laws, policies,
and institutions appear to be actuated by the implicitly shared goal of ascending that
scale.137 And finally fourth, that there are means by which to ascend further – hence by
which more fully to realize the mechanism – that we are not yet employing.
I’ll specify, then address, each of the challenges in serial order. I’ll note the justmentioned “fringe benefits” that addressing them produces as they are implicated.
The first challenge arises in connection with market-neutrality, in particular with
entry neutrality: If we are to equalize holdings of the material opportunity endowments
with which agent-distribuees enter the market, we must presumably commensurate those
endowments. But how are we to do that prior to the operation of the equal-endowment
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Hence we’ll see reason to displace even “positive” economics of law with a more convincing

picture.
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grounded market mechanism, when it is that mechanism itself that affords the ethically
satisfactory method of commensuration? Is there not a pragmatic indeterminacy here
ultimately just as vitiating as the foundational indeterminacies found in III.A to afflict
utilitarianism, Rawlsian justice theory and normative economics of law?
The answer is no. To show why not we proceed in three steps: First we
demarcate certain classes of material opportunity endowment that are unambiguously
ethically exogenous in the holding; call these “core endowments.” Second we indicate
means by which holdings of those can be readily equalized. Finally third, we show that
any forward movement in these directions is unambiguous movement toward the
ethically optimal distribution. The upshot is that the ideal mechanism is
straightforwardly approached in continuous upward-sloped fashion. (Note that this
means we’ll corroborate the second and fourth noteworthy facts mentioned a moment
ago.)
First, then, core endowments: At least four classes of endowment are
uncontroversially ethically exogenous in the holding: First, the genetic determinants and
obstacles, so far as we are able to determine them at any given time, of and to successful
welfare-pursuit: Many handicaps are obvious and incontestably undeserved; many
talents are likewise incontestably unearned. With the advance of empirical science we
grow ever more able to sort out, at least probabilistically, what is predisposed and what is
not. Second, childhood healthcare and education: Children do not earn or deserve
greater or lesser access to such assets, particularly when very young. Their degrees of
responsibility gradually grow as they move toward adulthood. Third, inherited
nonhuman capital, i.e. money-valued wealth: Like other forms of inheritance this one is
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morally arbitrary. Moreover, it does not grow less so with time and maturation. Finally
fourth, opportunity to shed or share unforeseeable risk through trade or collective riskpooling action. This is best seen as non-confiscatory compensation for deficits in other
resources or material opportunity.138
Now note that core endowments of these types not only are manageable in
number, but with the advance of empirical science also are growing more readily
quantifiable, directly allocable, and indeed allocable equitably. They are also in little if
any need of commensuration inter se. If we distinguish between beneficial and
burdensome endowments, moreover, we see that this is particularly so of the beneficial
ones: early education, healthcare, and inherited non-human capital. The burdensome
endowments are somewhat more difficult, since they disproportionately include
physiologic resources. But they too are far from unmanageable.
The hardest of the latter is genetically poor health or handicap. Some such
deficiencies can be valued by reference to current prices affixed to their mitigation –
prostheses, medicines, etc. There seems no harm in beginning to address such deficits
with compensation equal to the going rates. Other such deficits are not so readily
mitigated. There the best that we can do is to estimate the compensation afforded by
insurance policies that typically are, or perhaps “would,” be purchased against such
contingencies were they available.139
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Some seek to include the presence of counter-traders in the opportunity set here. See, e.g.,
COLIN M. MACCLEOD, LIBERALISM, JUSTICE, AND MARKETS: A CRITIQUE OF LIBERAL EQUALITY (1998);
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note 121; and in Alexander Tabarrok, Trumping the Genetic Tarot Card, 9 CONTINGENCIES 20 (1997). See
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Clearly there is some guesswork here, but it need not be whistling in the dark.
With the growth of empirical knowledge we grow better at estimating with greater
reliability. We do what we can to repair the ship at sea, if I may borrow Neurath’s old
simile. The more such repairing we do, the better able the mechanism grows to improve
itself. I’ll show this below in connection with “nth bests,” thus completing the challenge
to neutrality’s attainability. First I’ll address the second challenge to mechanism
instantiability, however. For my subsequent treatment of “nth bests” completes the
addressing of that one as well.
The second challenge to mechanism-instantiability concerns completeness as the
first concerns neutrality. It runs thus: Is it reasonable to require that “all and only desired
trading” occur? Is that possible, and should we even wish it? Wouldn’t we have to
abandon our market-inalienability norms and “commodify” everything?140 And if we
don’t do that, can the opportunity-egalitarian market mechanism that I have described
discharge the tasks I’ve assigned it?
This challenge is more easily addressed than that directed to neutrality. First
divide it into its desirability and feasibility halves. Then dispatch the first of these first:
To begin with, consider the core opportunity endowments again: All of these are subject,
in principle, to unobjectionable market-valuability already. We’ve already
“commodified” what most needs commodifying here.
Next consider what else might be traded – in the earlier idiom, “all that enters into
responsible agent-distribuees’ welfare-pursuit.” It is easy enough simply to bracket out
140

The classic contemporary objection to “commodification” is Margaret Jane Radin, MarketInalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849 (1987). See also MICHAEL SANDEL, PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY (2005).
Contemporary protests of commodification revive concerns raised repeatedly in the past. Two classic
Victorian-era objections are THOMAS CARLYLE, PAST AND PRESENT (Robert Thorne ed., 1890); and JOHN
RUSKIN, UNTO THIS LAST AND OTHER WRITINGS 155-228 (Clive Wilmer ed., 1985).
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of market transactions such things as we might adjudge shouldn’t be commodified –
babies, blood, or human organs, for example – and still approximate to distributing goods
and services as best as we thereby permit ourselves to do. For again, as I’ll show, there
are “second” clear down to “nth bests” that are ordered equivalently to ordered degrees of
neutrality and completeness.141
That’s the desirability side of the “completeness” challenge. The feasibility side
comes in the transaction- and information-cost barriers to market-completion in the
technical sense. It goes like this: Is it reasonable to suppose that all parcelings of
ownable and tradable goods, and that payment-claims defined in terms of all specifiable
contingencies, might be made tradable? Can we really “complete” markets in the sense
you require?142 Here the problem, the guise of which is more technical than the
alienability guise, can be handled in three ways.
The first way is to note that it is by now a well established theorem of general
equilibrium- and stochastic calculus-rooted financial theory that complete markets can be
simulated through a comparatively small number of hedging strategies.143 Moreover,
many more contingent claims markets are providable than currently provided. And the
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number of such claims that can be made tradable is growing almost by the day. I exploit
those facts elsewhere.144 So we can do a lot more completing than thus far we’ve done.
The second and third ways of addressing the completeness challenge are more
immediately satisfying. Note for one thing that greater entry-neutrality itself yields
greater completeness. Here is why: First, completeness rides in part upon all desired
trading’s being available. Second, more trades per unit of wealth occur at lower levels
along personal wealth curves. Third, entry neutrality accordingly opens market doors to
larger numbers of participants who enter at the low end. Hence greater entry neutrality
results in more trade.
Note for another thing that the completeness-feasibility problem has no more than
an illusory “bite” here. For as my answer to the third, final challenge will show, more
complete and more neutral always means more consistent with an opportunity-egalitarian
allocation: There is an ordered set of “nth bests” that is ordinally equivalent to the set of
“more” complete and “more” neutral markets. Let me, then, turn to the third challenge.
The third challenge is this: Suppose you cannot achieve full completeness and
neutrality of the sort that characterizes the ideal mechanism. In such case, might you not
in seeking merely more completeness and neutrality than you presently have, ironically
end up farther from your ideal end-state? Hasn’t Hart, for example, proved that the move
from less to more complete markets short of full completeness can incur Pareto-losses?145
The suggestion, then, is that ascending degrees of completeness and neutrality
might not be ordinally equivalent to a scale of nth bests. The suggestion happens to be
144
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false. I’ll explain why intuitively, reserving technical treatment to the formal Appendix.
The intuitive reply is that the suggestion turns crucially on a normatively uninteresting
conception of efficiency. Indeed it turns on a conception of efficiency that we have
already found, in effect, to be ethically noncognizable above at II.D.1 and III.A.3.
“Efficiency,” in the everyday sense of the word, connotes the maximization of
output given a stipulated input, or the minimization of input given a stipulated output. It
means roughly “more” or “the same,” respectively, for “the same” or for “less.” The
more technical understandings of “efficiency” familiar to welfare economists and
normative economists of law amount to variations on that theme:
Pareto-efficient distributions of goods or ills to persons are best understood,
intuitively, as distributions the quasi-aggregated preference-satisfactions deriving from
which cannot be raised without lowering the individual preference of at least one person.
That is the sense in which it amounts to a form of “efficiency,” the one sense in which it
can warrant the use of that word. Pareto efficiency is the maximization of aggregate
preference-satisfaction as constrained by a polity-conferred “veto.” The veto in this case
is that wielded by any distribuee – including a thief, per the discussion in II.C.1 – who
stands to suffer a satisfaction loss in consequence of some departure from a given
distribution.
Kaldor-Hicks efficiency is yet closer to the workaday understanding of
“efficiency.” The reason is that it is unapologetically aggregative rather than quasiaggregative: Distributions are efficient in the Kaldor-Hicks sense if there is no departure
from them that would render some parties’ aggregated gains greater than other parties’
aggregated losses. The guiding intuition, then, again is that the scalar welfare output of a
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given wealth-distributive input vector is, given the individual welfare functions (input
vector components) that we have to work with, the “highest” it can be.146
But now consider what this means. It means that Pareto and Kaldor-Hicks
efficiency alike are forms of “naïve maximization,” in the parlance of Part II.D.1. They
are in consequence normatively inert. Their maximanda – distributive-ethically
unfiltered preference satisfaction in the one case, opportunity-indifferent “wealth” in the
other, per II.C.1 and II.C.2 above – are ethically irrelevant magnitudes. They are no
better than forehead height, to recur to an example discussed in the Introduction.
Efficiency on either the Paretian or the Kaldor-Hicksian, then, is devoid of
normative interest. The only form of welfare that matters is what we called in Part II.D
“equal-opportunity-grounded welfare.” The only form of efficiency that matters,
accordingly, is that form which maximizes this form of welfare. And the maximization
of this form of welfare, as we saw in II.D.3, “takes care of itself” as we work to equalize
the distribuendum that is material opportunity over the distribuees who are boundedly
responsible agents.147 The upshot is that the third challenge facing the opportunityegalitarian market mechanism evaporates.148
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One “produces” welfare, in the Pareto and the Kaldor-Hicks senses, by distribution operations.
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competencies.
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3. The Role of Law
I mentioned at page 83 that among the advantages offered by reflecting upon how
to instantiate that distribution mechanism which gives best expression to the most
plausible distributive ethic is this: We notice in doing so that the laws, policies, and
institutions typically encountered in the advanced political-economies seems intended in
large part to foster and buttress some such mechanism as that I have just sketched and
defended.149 If this is so, then thinking along the lines of III.B.1 and III.B.2 just above
offers further advantages.
First, it will enable us better to interpret our own legal tradition, and thus to
extend the tradition in a manner more in keeping with its own animating ideals. Second
and relatedly, it will position us well to improve the laws, policies, and institutions that
we have, with a view to rendering the resultant mechanism both more complete and more
neutral, hence more fully in keeping with its own opportunity-egalitarian ideal. And
third, by way of theoretic side-benefit, it will enable us better to see what mainline
economics of law has got right and got wrong, hence better to fashion that discipline
itself in a manner that leaves it less prescriptively mute than it is presently. Let me, then,
at least preliminarily bear out the interpretive claim.
Much familiar private law doctrine seems to be transparently opportunityegalitarian and responsibility-vindicating in character. In connection with the latter,
consider the centrality of the concept of “diligence” across property, contract, and tort,
for example. Likewise adverse possession in property, mitigation of damages in contract,
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and comparative negligence in tort. Even the presumption in favor of contractual
freedom seems rooted in respect for autonomy – i.e., responsible agency.
As for opportunity-equality, consider the treatment of bargaining power and
capacity in contract and testament. In remedies, concern for “making the plaintiff whole”
per the compensatory damages regime looks straight-forwardly actuated by
considerations of corrective justice: It is a matter of equalizing present circumstances to
a status quo ante. And the many doctrines of equity jurisprudence that pervade our law
are of course transparently exogenous circumstance equalizing and responsibility
vindicating in nature, as both the term “equity” and the doctrines’ Thomist-Aristotelian
roots would have led one to anticipate.
Turning from private to public law, the best interpretation of most marketregulatory norms in advanced political-economies is as attempts to afford something like
greater neutrality and completeness of the sorts I’ve assayed just above. Laws
prohibiting invidious discrimination on the basis of racial, gender, and other ineluctable
or morally arbitrary traits, for example, look to be straightforward cases of processneutrality-promotion. Public education and sundry forms of government-facilitated
social insurance for their parts are aimed at promoting entry-neutrality. They work to
equalize ethically exogenous material opportunity endowments – the “Ri” of Part II.D.3.
Such neutrality-boosting measures, moreover, for reasons noted earlier tend to enhance
market completeness as well.
There are other completeness-enhancing measures that advanced political
economies have taken steadily over the past decades and even centuries. The trend in
respect of “commodification,” for example, seems by and large to have been to permit,
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and indeed in many cases even to foster, the trading of more and more goods and
services, including contingent claims. Witness the government-fostering of secondary
debt “securitization” markets in the US since the 1930s, for example, as well as its
funding much research that’s lead to the design of derivative securities.150
The trend in re “commodification” also has been to “unbundle” more and more
once-conjoined items into separately traded items. Conspicuous cases of such marketfostering include government regulatory and start-up support for active markets in
securities, derivatives, and more recently pollution rights trading, for example.
Conspicuous cases of mandated unbundling – which incidentally show again the linkage
between neutrality and completeness – include antitrust action against large
telecommunications concerns in the 1980s and software manufacturers in the 1990s.
The fact that such measures can often be argued to enhance aggregate social
welfare, wealth or consumer surplus should not surprise us. Nor should it be taken for
unalloyed indication that legislatures or common law judges do, let alone ought, to craft
law, doctrine or policy with a view to such goals. All the less should it be taken for
encouragement to conceive “improvements” we think likely more fully to effect aims of
that sort. For we have seen now that opportunity-indifferent aggregate-maximizing is
normatively empty. And we have seen that equal-opportunity-grounded maximizing
nevertheless overlaps in part, short of full coextension, with other forms of
maximizing.151
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That fact itself explains how “positive” economists of law in the past were able to
suppose common law judges subconsciously actuated by Kaldor-Hicksian wealthmaximizing aims. We would effectively fine-tune mainline economics of law, then, by
interpreting our legal arrangements as being aimed at edging us closer to the responsible
agency, equal opportunity ideal, and framing our own efforts at improvement in keeping
with the same.
If I am correct in what I suggest here, then a substantial new research agenda is
opened for what might be called an “ethically intelligible economics of law.” Some
actual or proposed rules thought wealth-maximizing in ethically inert ways, for example,
will prove suboptimal by lights of the opportunity-egalitarian ideal. Responsive
amendments to such rules might accordingly carry us further along in the direction of
realizing the ideal mechanism I have schematized. Parallel remarks of course hold of our
efforts to interpret and extend the rules that we have, as well as to formulate, legislate,
and administratively implement the best new policies and programs we can.

4. Comparative Legal & Institutional Competencies
I should, in closing this discussion of distribution mechanisms, perhaps say a few
words about what I am not claiming. Certainly I do not mean to suggest that courts
should attempt to make general determinations of litigants’ overall material opportunity
allotments in deciding cases. Even less do I mean to imply that they should allow such
determinations to enter into decisions as to who should prevail in litigated cases, as if
courts were engines of non-case-specific compensation or distribution more generally.
Nor do I even intend here to recommend that legislators or policy-makers as a general
rule amalgamate spheres of human activity in their thinking so as to prescribe, say, that
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citizens who fare unjustifiably poorly in one sphere of activity be held to different
standards in other spheres of activity, in order that they may be “compensated overall.”
My gut intuition, which I take to be widely shared,152 runs in the other direction.
It is that the integrity and longterm stability of institutions operating in the many different
“spheres” of activity that jointly constitute a pluralist society require we not typically
determine individuals’ outcomes in one sphere by reference to their outcomes in other
spheres.153 Hence my intuition is that full opportunity-equality among citizens requires
our working severally – but simultaneously – toward opportunity-equality sphere by
sphere. Severally, for the sake of institutional integrity sphere by sphere. But
simultaneously, because the opportunity-egalitarian ideal is best realized in each when
well realized in all.154 But this is, alas, not the place either to commit to or argue for
these provisional judgments. More is required to think-through the question effectively
than space permits here.
My claim here is accordingly more modest. It is simply that, where rules or
programs or policies are crafted or drafted, the crafting and drafting ought to be done
with equal regard for citizens conceived as boundedly responsible agents. It is also that
doing this in turn requires that judges, legislatures, and administrative agencies view their
role in this way: First, they are to equalize such benefits and burdens as both (a) they are
themselves institutionally authorized to be effectively bestowing, and (b) are ethically
exogenous in the holding by the citizens in regard to whom they are acting. And at the
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same time second, they are to dispense in proportion to differential responsibility such
ethically endogenous benefits and burdens as they are institutionally authorized to be
effectively bestowing. One entailment of this latter claim, in light of the foregoing
subsections, is that legal doctrine and legislative policy ought generally be elaborated
with a view to broadening the reach and improving the operation of the distribution
mechanism I’ve schematized.
These observations bear some possible implications for a thus far inconclusive
discussion on institutional roles taking place in the legal-economic literature. One strand
of this discussion has it that courts are better suited to maximizing aggregate wealth in
the incremental crafting of legal doctrine, while distributional concerns are more
efficiently (more deadweight-loss-avoidingly) handled through tax policy.155 I must
defer fuller discussion of such matters to another venue. Two comments, however, can
be offered in light of the foregoing discussion.
First, in light of what has emerged over the previous pages, the “efficiency”
appealed to in these debates just will not be of normative interest if decoupled from the
responsible agency, equal material opportunity ideal. Second, assigning distributional
tasks on the one hand, naïve maximizing tasks on the other to separate institutional
spheres raises considerable and possibly inescapable risk. One is that the normatively
intelligible maximandum itself cannot be identified apart from the equal material
opportunity backdrop against which normatively relevant maximizing activity on the part
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of responsible agents takes place. Another is that the institutional decoupling of welfare
or income reward from discrete transactional settings tends to undermine the continued
practice of responsible agency itself.
A practical corollary implied by the more fine-grained nature of the mechanism
we have seen best to instantiate the responsible agency, equal opportunity ideal, we might
say, is a principle of subsidiarity: Rewards to responsible agency should follow as
proximately to particular exercises of such agency as possible. The want of precisely this
form of proximity, recall, is one of the flaws that we found to vitiate veiled-choice
distribution scenarios, including Vickrey’s, Harsanyi’s, and Rawls’s. And its tying
minute-by-minute distributive changes as closely as possible to the voluntary transactions
that immediately produce them is itself part of what recommends the more micro-detailed
distribution mechanism that has been this Part’s principal preoccupation.

CONCLUSION
We have covered much ground here. As we have seen, though, there is much
ground to clear, and perhaps that fact itself affords warrant for coverage.
Notwithstanding what we have done here, it is clear that much more has to be done.
Indeed, if I’m right in what I have been arguing, there is more to be done than we have
hitherto realized. For it seems we have been on the wrong track now for years, where the
normative theory of law’s links to economy is concerned. We have been fixated upon
end-states that are not only in the end unmeasurable, but are normatively uninteresting
even as aims. And all the while we should have been looking toward ethically salient
opportunity “inputs” whose right distribution allows rightful “outputs” to take care of
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themselves. Just as our deep opportunity-egalitarian commitments have been found here,
upon distributive structure-sensitive analysis, to counsel.
If collective action affects distributions of benefits and burdens to our fellow
citizens, we cannot help but think-through the ethics of distribution: We must “take
distribution seriously.” And if we find, on analysis, that distributive ethics call out for the
growing and spreading of material opportunity, we must think-through how that can be
done. Consider the breathtaking sweep of the research agenda that opens.
What are the real determinants of real, equal-opportunity-grounded well-being –
the real material opportunities? What means can we develop for more accurately limning
the boundary between ethically exogenous and ethically endogenous such opportunities?
How might we best design means of spreading the former, so that the latter – the sole
ethically intelligible maximand – might be maximized? What institutions are better at
what in that project, and how much functional specialization of the sort rendering
institutions less visibly part of just wholes can endure? All of these questions and others
press upon us urgently, the moment we see that we can’t really dodge them.
For far too long now – just over a century, in fact – Paretian complacency and its
bedfellow, Kaldor-Hicksian wealth fetishism, have worked as a mere ball and chain.
They’ve conferred vetoes upon beneficiaries of morally arbitrary distributions, for
literally no normatively cognizable reason what ever. Now that we see they are not only
unnecessary, but in fact incompatible with prescription itself, it is high time we tossed
them.156
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See Hockett, Why Paretians Can’t Prescribe: Preferences, Principles and Imperatives in Law
and Economics (working paper, 2007); also Hockett, Prescriptive Paretian, note 1.
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Think of how liberating that will be. It will be freeing of us and our fellows in
our roles as citizens, whose lives and life prospects together will vastly improve. It will
be freeing of scholarship too – of work that can now be both practically useful and
theoretically sound, not to say edifying. Think also of what this will mean both for law
and for economics: Both will be reconciled again to their origins, in ethics. Both will
again be what once they were admitted to be – moral sciences.157 Both will be healthy
again. For they will be home.

157

Ethics and economics were of course once united under the Cambridge “Moral Sciences
Tripos.” See, e.g,. ROBERT SKIDELSKY, JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES (1983). And of course Adam Smith,
seemingly the patron saint of Chicago, lectured and wrote not only on political economy, but upon ethics
and jurisprudence as well.
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